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Foreword 
 
Juuso Vanhala’s doctoral dissertation is an interesting collection of essays focusing on 
labor market frictions, technological change and cyclical shocks. The first essay 
investigates the role of skill mismatch in determining the relation between economic 
growth and equilibrium unemployment by adding vintage human capital into the 
standard vintage capital/search model to study the relation between capital-embodied 
growth and equilibrium unemployment. He shows that faster human capital 
depreciation reduces unemployment, which leads to more job creation and less job 
destruction. This effect works in an opposite direction compared with the standard 
capital obsolence effect that reduces job duration. The second essay examines a search 
model with heterogeneous workers and jobs by assuming that high-quality workers 
can undertake both high-quality and low-quality jobs, while low-quality workers can 
only carry out low-quality jobs. He extends the existing literature as follows: (i) the 
distribution of skills across workers is endogenized and (ii) the labour force 
participation is also endogenized. The third essay concentrates on business cycles and 
taxation in a matching model by studying the effects of labour taxes and reforms 
thereof on equilibrium unemployment and the sensitivity of an economy to 
macroeconomic shocks. The policy instruments to be analyzed are (i) the marginal tax 
rate, (ii) the tax subsidy to produce a tax progression scheme and (iii) the replacement 
ratio to account for variability in the outside option for workers. He shows, for 
example, that a higher marginal tax rate and a higher replacement ratio amplify 
shocks, while tax subsidies dampen them.   
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1 Background
The state of the labor market and the macroeconomy are shaped by continuous
restructuring and reallocation of resources. Old production units and jobs are
destroyed and new ones are created as the resources of the economy seek more
productive uses. This churning is driven by the basic nature of economic activity.
Innovations (e.g. computerization) change the production technologies available to
rms and workers, changing consumer preferences alter the demand of goods and
services, and shocks that change the economic climate hit economies from time to
time. Firms and workers reallocate to accommodate these changes and to seek
more protable economic opportunities. Restructuring takes place at all levels of
the economy: individual job-worker matches separate and reallocate when the mu-
tual potential for benets is exhausted, whole sectors of the economy may become
obsolete and be replaced by new emerging sectors. Restructuring is also both a long
run and a short run phenomenon: long run growth is characterized by continuous
adoption to new production technologies, but restructuring takes place also at busi-
ness cycle frequency. The large scale and continuously ongoing restructuring and
reallocation of resources is often referred to by the Schumpeterian notion of creative
destruction. Ideally, the destruction of production units frees ine¢ cient economic
resources to more productive use, to match in more protable combinations, making
the economy work at its maximum potential. Reality is not as smooth as this ideal,
however, as restructuring involves frictions and rigidities when production factors
search new partners to match with.
The large labor market ows and frictions involved in reallocation have received
considerable attention in recent research. The ows into and out of unemployment
are quantitatively huge although the variations in the stocks of employment and
unemployment may be small. The empirical literature (e.g. Davis et al. (1996) or
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Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004)) documents typical ows both in and out of unem-
ployment to be of an annual rate of about ten percent of the labor force for OECD
economies. Matching frictions or problems of mismatch related to job ows have
been evidenced by a large body of studies of a relationship between unemployment
and vacancies known as the Beveridge curve (Blanchard and Diamond 1989, Nickell
et al. 2003). The Beveridge curve (V/U curve) may be considered as an indicator of
mismatches of the labor market as it describes a negative relationship between the
equilibrium unemployment rate and the vacancy rate. Whereas movements along
the curve indicate cyclical uctuations, outwards shifts in the curve reect deterio-
ration in the matching process of rms and workers. These studies have observed an
outwards shift of the Beveridge curve for most OECD countries from the 1960s (see
e.g. European Central Bank 2002 for a summary). An outward shift of the curve
reects a simultaneous increase in both the number of unemployed workers and
the number of open vacancies. This simultaneous excess supply suggests increasing
problems of labor market mismatches.1
This dissertation studies labor market mismatches and rigidities, that arise
from exogenous changes in the economy; technological change and macroeconomic
shocks. The rst essay studies skill mismatch related to long run economic growth
and technological change. The second essay investigates skill biased technological
change, the allocation of worker and job types, skill mismatch and job competition,
which have become important phenomena in European economies. The nal essay
studies the interaction of matching frictions and labor taxation, and investigates the
potential role of taxation and labor market frictions in determining the sensitivity
of an economy to cyclical uctuations. This dissertation analyzes reallocation both
from the long run and the short run perspective, but with a common perspective on
labor markets: idleness of resources is an inevitable ingredient of reallocation. Al-
though resources are reallocated to more productive use, frictions and mismatches
imply idleness of resources as a by-product. The focus of this work is in perhaps
the most visible type of economic idleness - unemployment. The dissertation con-
tributes to the literature on theoretical matching models, and their applications to
labor markets and the macroeconomy.
1An interesting feature in the shifts of the Beveridge curves is that after the mid- 1980s,
countries fall into two groups. For the rst group the shift has continued and for the second group
there has been a turnaround s.t. the curve has started moving back to the left . The rst group
cosnsists of Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Norway, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.
The second group cosnsists of Canada, Denmark, Netherlands, the UK and the US. Australia,
Austria, New Zealand and Portugal are somewhat ambiguous, although they rather belong to the
latter group. (Nickell et al. 2003)
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Search-matching models have become the workhorse modelling framework of
theoretical labor economics and the literature has become extensive in the past
decade (Rogerson et al. 2005). These models acknowledge the central role of the
ows and frictions that are associated to the continuously ongoing restructuring in
economies. Frictions can basically be considered as anything that interferes with
the smooth and instantaneous exchange of goods and services. The labor market
has attracted perhaps the most theoretical and empirical interest in this area of
research, because of the heterogeneities that prominently feature in these markets,
but also the availability of data on job and worker ows enable testing the theory
(Pissarides 2002).
The current search-matching models of the labor market have their founda-
tions in the early study by Phelps (1970) who showed search theory to be useful
in analyzing the natural rate of unemployment and the trade-o¤ between ination
and unemployment.2 The contributions of Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982) and
Pissarides (1985) lead to the development of the current equilibrium models which
produce more accurate predictions of the behavior of the labor market than the neo-
classical framework (Pissarides 2002). Instead of setting the focus on the real wage
cost of labor and the stock of labor demand, the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides
model centers on the dynamic labor market ows and the matching of rms and
workers. In equilibrium the ows into and out of unemployment are equal. The
centerpiece of these models is the matching process of rms and workers. These
models acknowledge that nding a worker for a job, or for a worker to nd an
open job vacancy, is a time consuming and costly activity that is characterized by
search frictions. Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) provide an extensive discussion
on the matching process of unemployed workers and vacancies and on the micro-
foundations of the matching function. The Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides search
and matching model has established itself as the standard theory of equilibrium
unemployment. Despite the popularity of the model, several criticisms have been
made and important research is being made in many areas of this eld.3 The issues
studied in this dissertation relate to three currently active areas of research. The
rst two relate economic restructuring and reallocation in the long run, the third is
related to macroeconomic shocks and short run restructuring.
A long tradition of works on growth and unemployment has produced a number
2Even earlier contributions to this area were Stiglers (1961) xed-sample rule, which chooses
the optimal number of sellers before buying at the lowest price, and McCalls (1970) idea of an
optimal reservation price, upon which to stop search (see e.g. Pissarides 2002).
3For thorough surveys on search and matching models see Rogerson et al. (2005) or Mortensen
and Pissarides (1998). Pissarides (2000) presents an excellent overview of matching models.
3
of perspectives on the growth-unemployment relationship. Indeed, the relation
between technical progress and unemployment has proven to be controversial both
in popular debate and in the theoretical literature. Studies on the link between
technical progress and unemployment have produced conicting results and the
literature has pointed out that the relation between labor markets and technical
progress is far from unidimensional (Calmfors and Holmlund 2000).4
In models where the rate of technical progress or growth is assumed exogenous,
technology can be assumed to be disembodied or embodied. In the former approach
new technology benets all new and existing jobs, without a need to replace the
capital stock for the existing rms (Pissarides 2000). In Aghion and Howitt (1994)
rms capitalizethe benets of new technology through spillovers, which increase
the returns to jobs and leads to the creation of more vacancies and lower equilibrium
unemployment. In the second approach technology is embodied in capital and the
idea of creative destruction is predominant. In vintage models of this type,
new technology benets only rms that explicitly invest in it, thus raising only
the productivity of matches with the new technology. Consequently, rms using
older technology vintages are eventually made obsolete by the new generations of
technologies.
Studies by Aghion and Howitt (1994, 1998) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1998)
have advocated the vintage capital - matching framework, which has become the
benchmark for the study of growth and unemployment. In these models the tech-
nological frontier and productivity of new jobs increase in time, but the technology
of capital and productivity of a worker in a given match are xed at the time of
job creation. The competing new jobs pay higher wages due to their higher pro-
ductivity. A feature of these models is the implicit assumption of perfect labor
mobility between technology vintages.5 New more productive jobs raise the outside
option of an employed worker and raise the wage in existing matches. This leads to
declining and eventually zero match surplus and destruction of the match. Tech-
nological acceleration turns existing jobs unprotable and obsolete faster, reducing
the duration of job matches. Equilibrium unemployment is raised directly due to a
higher separation rate but also indirectly because shorter job duration and higher
wages reduce the protability of matches and reduce incentives to create new job
vacancies.
Aghion and Howitt (1998) extend the vintage framework to study the e¤ects
4See Calmfors and Holmlund (2000) for a survey on growth-unemployment studies.
5This means that workers are assumed to be able to change jobs to more recent technology
vintages, irrespective of the fact that their skills represent an older, maybe already obsolete tech-
nology vintage.
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of intersectoral complementarities. The value of jobs in a sector of the economy
increases with an increase in productivity in a sector producing complementary
intermediate inputs. Thus when sectors are highly complementary, growth of pro-
ductivity may lead to lower equilibrium unemployment even when there is no capi-
talization e¤ect. The study also discusses the feedback of unemployment back onto
the equilibrium growth rate.6 Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) present a more gen-
eral vintage matching model where rms are allowed to update their technology
by paying an implementation cost. When the cost is high enough, renovation of
matches is not worthwhile so obsolete jobs are destroyed endogenously and the e¤ect
of creative destruction dominates. When the cost of implementation is su¢ ciently
small, rms update obsolete matches and the capitalization e¤ect dominates. In
this case faster technical progress makes technological updating of jobs more fre-
quent, which keeps the jobs closer to the productivity frontier and makes them more
protable. This increases job creation and reduces equilibrium unemployment.
An intimately related area of research focuses on the interactions of technological
change, skills and specicity. Since the seminal work of Becker (1964) the problems
related to skill investment and specicity of skills have been acknowledged in the
literature. Caballero and Hammour (1997, 1998a, 1998b) study the implications of
specicity and appropriability of job specic rents in the context of growth and job
reallocation. They argue that capital is less elastic in the short run than in the long
run, and that the attempt by workers to appropriate capital will in the long term
lead to a substitution away from labor in favor of capital. The fear of substitution
constitutes a mechanism that prevents these attempts. Caballero and Hammour
(1998) analyze how quasi-rents and appropriation lead to underinvestment in pro-
duction factors and sclerotic behavior of the economy. Embodiment of technology
in capital vintages and job specic human capital gives rise to appropriable quasi
rents that distort job reallocation in the process of creative destruction.
A feature that has received attention in recent research is the idea of skill dy-
namics, i.e. the idea that human capital evolves over time. Ljungqvist and Sargent
(1998) study the determination of equilibrium unemployment in a model where
workers accumulate skills on the job and lose skills during unemployment. Their
focus is on how labor market policy a¤ects the search incentives and skill deprecia-
tion. Their model produces duration dependence to unemployment. Skill dynamics
are also present in Laing et al. (2003) who incorporate growth of the stock of
public knowledge in the economy. They introduce overlapping generations (vin-
tages) of workers who di¤er in productivities s.t. knowledge growth is embodied in
6Creative destruction e¤ects of are also analyzed in Caballero and Hammour (1994, 1996) with
a more cyclical perspective.
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new entrant workers. In this setup the entry of new (younger) workers renders the
knowledge of older workers obsolete. Galor and Moav (2000) build a growth model
which is characterized by ability biased technological transition where technolog-
ical acceleration leads to a rise in wage inequality both between and within skill
groups. In their study, technological progress is assumed to reduce the adaptability
of existing human capital for the new technological environment. While superior
technologies increase productivity, they also erode existing human capital that is
adaptable to the new technologies, thus reducing productivity. A characteristic of
their model is that able individuals have a comparative advantage in adapting to
new technology. Violante (2002) considers workers with two-dimensional skills. An
employed worker accumulates skills by learning-by-doing, but when changing jobs
to one of a more recent technological vintage, only a fraction of the workers skills
are transferable. Technological acceleration reduces workerscapacity to transfer
skills from old to new machines, generating cross-sectional variance of skills and
therefore wages. Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) and Violante (2002) do not study
the creative destruction -nature of technological change as their models do not
embed the vintage capital structure. Carré and Drouot (2004) introduce learning-
by-doing into a vintage capital framework but do not consider transferability of
skills between technology vintages.
The rst essay (Chapter 2) relates to the issues above. Within a vintage-
matching model the essay studies skill transferability between jobs and the e¤ect of
growth and technological change on job creation, job destruction and equilibrium
unemployment.
Another area of intensive research in the past decade has focused on skill mis-
match, job competition and crowding in labor markets. Most OECD countries have
experienced a the structural change in both the supply and demand for skills over the
last three decades. Universally a strong shift in demand for more highly educated
labor has occurred, which is to a large degree associated with skill-biased techno-
logical change. At the same time the educational level of workers has increased.
Changes in the supply of labor have varied more between countries, but a strong
trend toward an increased proportion of workers with college training is universal
in the OECD. Along with skill-biased technical change and the higher educational
levels, labor markets have been subject to increasing mismatch between the skills
of workers and the skills required by rms. In EU countries that have experienced
an intense upgrading of tertiary education within the last fteen years, the supply
of skilled workers has outstripped the supply of skilled jobs and job competition,
overeducation and crowding out have been particularly relevant (Dolado et al.
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2003). Collecting results from various studies on the incidence of mismatch Hartog
(2000) concludes that the incidence of overeducation has increased while the inci-
dence of undereducation has decreased for three countries for which observations are
available (Netherlands 1960-1995, Spain 1985-1990 and Portugal 1982-1992). For
some countries however, notably the United States and Great Britain, the devel-
opment of skill demand and supply has been somewhat di¤erent. In particular the
United States experienced a sharp slowdown in the growth of the supply of skills
after the 1980s (Katz 1994).
A number of theoretical studies have investigated these issues. Davis (1995)
and Acemoglu (1999) investigate how well the labor market performs in matching
workers and rms, both in terms of total vacancy creation and in the allocation
of vacancy creation across job types. They study the performance of a frictional
labor market with decentralized bargaining compared to the socially optimal job
creation outcome and examine the extent to which the market outcome produces
mismatch in the demand and supply for skills. Davis (1995) and Acemoglu (1999)
show that matching markets with heterogeneous jobs tend to produce too many
badjobs and too few goodjobs. They argue that whenever workers have any
bargaining power the rms marginal cost from investing in high productivity jobs
exceeds the marginal increase in the rms surplus as some fraction of the surplus
goes to the worker whereas the cost goes solely to the rm. A zero share of match
surplus for workers is then required to provide rms incentives to allocate vacancy
creation optimally to high skill jobs. Furthermore, Davis (1995) and Ljungqvist
and Sargent (2000) show that there is a fundamental conict between achieving
an optimal allocation of vacancies and an optimal total amount of vacancies. The
latter requires that the Hosios (1990) condition is satised which implies a posi-
tive bargaining power for workers to prevent excess total vacancy creation. This
fundamental tension in achieving e¢ ciency in both respects, allocative e¢ ciency
requiring zero bargaining power and e¢ ciency in total creation requiring a positive
bargaining power for workers, makes policy recommendations particularly di¢ cult.
In the above studies heterogeneity is present only on the rmsside of the market
as workers are homogeneous and they are all assumed to be suitable for all jobs. As
this assumption is somewhat unappealing, models where heterogeneity is present
on both sides of the market have emerged subsequently. Mortensen and Pissarides
(1999) study skill biased technological change in a model where jobs have skill
requirements and suitability of workers to jobs is a key feature. In their model the
labor market is fully segmented to sub-markets according to skill. Marimon and
Zilibotti (1999) develop a model of two-sided heterogeneity to study skill biased
technological change and the allocation of workers to suitable jobs.
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Albrecht and Vroman (2002) and Gautier (2002) introduce the possibility of
cross-skill matching equilibrium in a matching model, where workers di¤er in skills
and rms di¤er in skill requirements. These models assume an exogenous skill
distribution of workers and rms make the choice of skill requirements (job type)
endogenously. The key feature in their models is the assumption of minimum skill
requirements for jobs. High-skill workers are suitable for both high-skilled jobs
and low-skilled jobs, but low-skilled workers are suitable only for low-skill jobs.
High-skill jobs are more productive than low-skill jobs, but high-skill jobs require
a high-skill worker and are therefore harder to ll. This implies that high-skilled
workers have a more favorable position in the labor market, as they are suitable
for both high and low-skill jobs whereas low-skill workers are suitable for low-skill
jobs only. It also implies that the relevant pool of unemployed workers to match
with is larger for rms that post low skill vacancies than it is for rms posting high
skill vacancies. Albrecht and Vroman (2002) study the equilibrium mix of job types
and the equilibrium relationship between worker and job characteristics, wages and
unemployment. Building on Albrecht and Vroman (2002), a number of studies have
extended the model of two-sided heterogeneity in various directions. Blazquez and
Jansen (2005) study the e¢ ciency of matching and nd contrasting results to those
of Davis (1995) and Acemoglu (1999). They show that matching markets with two-
sided heterogeneity tend to produce too many goodjobs and too few badjobs.
Mismatch manifests itself as job competition for low skill jobs and crowding out
of low-skill workers and is a signal of overeducation in the labor market. Dolado et
al. (2002, 2003) introduce on the job search into this type of framework.
The incentives for workers to invest in education have been studied since Becker
(1964) by numerous authors. Becker (1964) shows that investment in education is
e¢ cient from the social viewpoint in a competitive market as both the costs and
returns accrue equally to the worker. In the presence of labor market frictions this
is not the case however. As match surplus accrues only partially to the worker while
the costs, there is underinvestment in skills (see e.g. Acemoglu 1996). Moen (1999)
shows that when the job arrival rate for a worker depends on the skill level relative
to other workers, there may be overeducation, at least when job competition is high.
Skill mismatch and job competition are reected in wages and unemployment
rates across and within skill groups. However, as Murphy and Topel (1997) claim,
the unemployment rate has become less informative about the state of the labor
market. For example, in a study evaluating histories of unemployment and non-
employment among American men between 1967-1994, the unemployment rate in
1994, 4.7 percent, is only slightly higher than in 1974 or 1978-1979, whereas non-
participation more than doubled from the late 1960s to the 1990s (from 4 percent
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to 8.1 percent of the potential labor supply in 1994). When considering di¤erences
across skill groups, they observe a declining trend in the returns to work and labor
market opportunities, especially among the low skilled workers. This is reected
both as higher unemployment and higher nonparticipation rates.
Considering skill mismatch, unemployment and nonparticipation together is es-
sential as they reect two sides of the same phenomenon. As Sattinger (1995) points
out this leads to an important di¤erence with search models with a xed labor force:
a higher unemployment rate is consistent with higher a higher employment rate.
Or vice versa lower employment is consistent with a lower unemployment rate, so
that joblessness is absorbed to the pool of nonparticipants. Participation and la-
bor market heterogeneity have been studied in the literature (e.g. Sattinger 1995,
Pissarides 2000) by considering heterogeneous preferences of leisure or values of
non-market time (determined by. e.g. wealth). In earlier studies (e.g. McKenna
1987, Sattinger 1995) it has been common to assume that labor market participa-
tion depends positively on the value of being unemployed. More recently, Garibaldi
and Wasmer (2003, 2005) and Pries and Rogerson (2004) study the importance of
frictions in a model of endogenous participation which feature an irreversible entry
cost to participating to the labor market. They show that decisions to participate
and stop participating di¤er, and that labor supply is determined by two margins:
exit and entry. These margins coincide when the irreversible sunk cost vanishes.
The second essay (Chapter 3) studies skill mismatch and job competition follow-
ing this tradition of research. The essay considers skill biased technological change
and the endogenous determination of workersskills and labor market participation.
The business-cycle-frequency implications of reallocation in the labor market
and the frictions involved with it have recently been subject to intensive research.
There are to active areas of research, one relating to the performance of the Mortensen-
Pissarides matching model, the other relating to the performance of business cycle
models.
There is a rapidly growing literature on a central handicap of the Mortensen-
Pissarides matching framework (Mortensen and Pissarides 1994, Pissarides 2000),
often referred to as the Shimer critique. With shocks of a plausible magnitude the
matching model cannot generate the business-cycle-frequency uctuations in two
of its key elements, unemployment and vacancies (Shimer 2005). This handicap
of the model arises because the wage negotiated by Nash bargaining absorbs too
much of the shocks of an economy. Consequently, there has been an active debate
in the literature about the role and modeling of the wage in the matching model to
achieve more rigid wages (see e.g. Shimer 2005, Hall 2005, Mortensen and Nagypál
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2005, Hornstein et al. 2005). Popular solutions to this problem are variants of
the solution formalized by Hall (2005), where the wage is partly determined by
negotiation and partly by a wage norm. The problem in this solution is that the
wage norm is somewhat ad hoc.
An area which has received attention recently and where the application of
matching models is producing important advances is business cycle theory. A salient
feature of models of the business cycle has been their unsatisfactory performance
in producing shock responses that correspond to empirical evidence. This has been
the case for real business cycle (RBC) models in capturing some of the stylized
facts of the labor market and the shock persistence in output (den Haan et al.
1996, Merz 1995). For New Keynesian monetary models, capturing the persistence
in output and ination responses to monetary shocks has posed a major challenge
(Walsh 2005, Galí and Gertler 1999).7 In addition New Keynesian models have been
unable to explain why aggregate shocks cause large and persistent uctuations in
equilibrium unemployment (Trigari 2004).8
A number of recent papers have been successful in improving the performance of
real business cycle models by combining the search-matching framework of the labor
market to business cycle models. The rst wave of studies in this area (Merz 1995,
Andolfatto 1996, den Haan et al. 2000) applied the search-matching model to real
business cycle models. These studies showed that introducing matching frictions
of the labor market improves the shock responses of RBC models considerably. In
the past few years, the matching model has been applied to the New Keynesian
monetary model.9 Walsh (2003, 2005) and Trigari (2004) nd that introducing la-
7Monetary shocks generate a large and persistent hump-shape response in output. For example,
Christiano et al. (1999) nd that in response to a contractionary policy shock, after a delay of two
quarters there is a sustained decline in real GDP with the maximal decline taking place roughly
after a year to a year and a half after the policy shock. Ination behaves in a similar way but the
responds more slowly. After an initial delay, the policy shock generates a persistent decline in the
index of commodity prices s.t. the GDP deator is at for roughly a year and a half after which
it declines.
8For New Keynesian models with moderate degrees of price stickiness both the persistent
output and ination responses have been di¢ cult to capture and a number of extensions have
been studied to generate the observed persistence (see e.g. discussion in Galí and Gertler (1999)
and Christiano et al. (2001)). Galí and Gertler (1999) modify the Calvo (1983) -type price
stickiness and purely forward looking price setting by rms by allowing for a fraction of rms
that use a backward looking rule to set prices. Christiano et. al (2001) extend the baseline New
Keynesian model by introducing habit persistence in consumption preferences, adjustment costs
in capital investment and variable capital utilization. Dotsey and King (2001) introduce labor
supply variability through changes in employment, the extensive margin, instead of in the number
of hours, the intensive margin.
9See Clarida et al. (1999) for an excellent overview of the New Keynesian framework.
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bor market frictions and endogenous job destruction into the New Keynesian model
improves the performance of the model in generating shock responses that match
with U.S. data. A key feature of these models is that they introduce employment
adjustment in business cycle models through changes in the number of employed
workers (the extensive margin) instead of in the number of hours (the intensive
margin). This, combined with search frictions of the labor market, generates invol-
untary unemployment and sluggish employment adjustment into the business cycle
models. The rigidity in the adjustment of labor has proved to be of essence in gen-
erating persistence into the business cycle models. Following the idea of Hall (2005)
of a wage that is partly determined by negotiation and partly by a wage norm, wage
rigidity has been incorporated along with matching frictions to the New Keynesian
model in Krause and Lubik (2005). They demonstrate that the model performance
improves further, when wages respond less to shocks. Christo¤el and Linzert (2005)
and Christo¤el et al. (2005) come to similar conclusions. The remaining problem
of these models is the ad hoc nature of the wage norm. Blanchard and Galí (2005)
model wage rigidity to the New Keynesian model to study optimal monetary policy.
The third essay (Chapter 4) applies the Mortensen-Pissarides model to the New
Keynesian monetary framework. Particular focus in this study is set on the inter-
action of labor taxation with wage determination, job creation and destruction in
determining shock responses.
Below follows a summary of the three essays of this dissertation.
2 Growth, Skill Mismatch and Unemployment
The rst essay (Chapter 2) investigates the role of skill mismatch in determining
the relation between growth and equilibrium unemployment. The standard result
in vintage capital/search models is that a faster rate of technological growth tends
to increase equilibrium unemployment (Aghion and Howitt (1994) and Mortensen
and Pissarides (1998)). In a vintage capital model, new more productive technol-
ogy vintages enter the economy, making older generations of capital relatively less
productive. As workers operating old technology vintages may potentially change
to a job with a more productive and higher paying technology vintage, the jobs
with older technology vintages have to pay wages that take account of this. Even-
tually the increasing wage drives old capital vintages unprotable and these jobs
are destroyed. A faster rate of growth increases the capital obsolescence e¤ect that
tends to shorten job durations and increase unemployment incidence. These models
assume that workers skills are fully transferable from older technologies to cutting
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edge technologies.
In this essay, the standard vintage capital/search model of Aghion and Howitt
(1994) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) is extended to incorporate vintage
human capital. In addition to vintage capital and capital obsolescence present in
earlier models, skill obsolescence of workers is introduced into the vintage frame-
work. Workers learn through learning-by-doing while employed, but their learning
is specic to the vintage of technology they operate. Upon separation, workers be-
come unemployed and search for a new job. The amount of skills they can transfer
on the new jobs (of the leading edge vintage) is proportional to the technological
distance between the old and the new capital they work with. While unemployed,
skills keep becoming obsolete.
This essay highlights a new channel for the interaction between growth and un-
employment: as the rate of productivity growth increases, we not only have a capital
obsolescence e¤ect that tends to shorten job durations and increase unemployment
incidence, but we also have a skill obsolescence e¤ect that reduces the value of
unemployment and tends to o¤set the former force. Job creation and destruction
are analyzed on the assumption of skill obsolescence being independent of the rate
of technical change, and on the assumption that the rate of skill obsolescence and
the rate of technical change are related so that transferability is decreasing in the
productivity growth parameter.
A two-dimensional nature of skills (Violante 2002) is adopted into the vintage
matching framework. There are two technological parameters in the model, the
speed of technical change which measures the rate of capital obsolescence and skill
transferability which measures the rate of skill obsolescence. One can also conjecture
that the rate of skill obsolescence and the rate of technical change are related so that
transferability is decreasing in the productivity growth parameter. The productivity
growth parameter is thought of as capturing the degree to which new features of
the technologies are embodied in capital, and therefore the extent to which capital
is di¤erent across vintages.
First, assuming that skill transferability is independent of the rate of technical
change, an increase in the latter increases both unemployment incidence and unem-
ployment duration. Therefore the equilibrium unemployment rate unambiguously
increases as in the standard vintage model. An increase in the transferability pa-
rameter has the opposite e¤ect, both unemployment incidence and unemployment
duration decrease and equilibrium unemployment decreases.
Next, the impact of an increase in the rate of technical change is studied when
skill transferability is decreasing in the productivity growth parameter. A condition
to distinguish between two cases is derived: when skills depreciate su¢ ciently little
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with the rate of technical change technological so that obsolescence dominates and
when skills depreciate fast enough with the rate of technical change so that skill
obsolescence dominates. For the former unemployment increases with an increase
in the rate of technical change and for the latter unemployment decreases. The
conclusion is that the comparative static results of the standard vintage matching
model are reversed when skill depreciation is fast enough.
3 Skill Biased Technological Change, Skill Deter-
mination and Labor Market Participation
The second essay (Chapter 3) studies skill biased technological change, skill mis-
match and the allocation of workers and rms in the labor market. Within a
matching model with two-sided heterogeneity (e.g. Albrecht and Vroman (2002),
Gautier (2002)), we study how rms allocate vacancy creation between high and
low productivity jobs, and how workers allocate between labor market states. The
novelty of this study is to introduce an endogenously determined distribution of
the workforce between high and low skill workers. This feature of the model is of
relevance at least for long run analysis of labor markets, as one expects workers
educational choices to respond to market incentives. The model is then extended
to allow for a complete choice of labor market states, by introducing endogenous
labor market participation to the model.
The essay builds on a matching model of two-sided heterogeneity with high
and low skilled workers and minimum skill requirements for high productivity jobs.
As Albrecht and Vroman (2002), we take this to mean that low skilled workers
are qualied for low productivity jobs only and high skilled workers are qualied
for both high and low productivity jobs. The high skilled, however, are not more
productive in the low productivity jobs than low skilled workers. This implies that
high-skilled workers have a more favorable position in the labor market, as they
are suitable for both high and low-skill jobs whereas low-skill workers are suitable
for low-skill jobs only. It also implies that the relevant pool of unemployed workers
to match with is larger for rms that post low skill vacancies than it is for rms
posting high skill vacancies.
By allowing for workers to invest in skills, we extend a matching model with two-
sided heterogeneity to incorporate an endogenous distribution of high and low skill
workers. Upon entry to the labor market workers may pay a one time education cost
to become high skilled instead of remaining low skilled. Their decision to upgrade
their skills depends on the cost of acquiring high skills and on the labor market
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prospects for both worker types (i.e. the payo¤ of upgrading skills). The relative
values of being high or low skilled depend on the relative productivities between
job/worker types and the job competition that the worker faces in the job market
from other workers.
We show that the skill cost wrt. the obtained skill level plays a key role in
determining the labor market outcomes of the model. Because workers appropriate
surplus from the rms to compensate for the skill investment, a key feature of the
model is how large a share of match surplus the workers can appropriate and which
type of rms are hit harder by appropriation. The degree to which high skill workers
can appropriate match surplus from jobs depends on the costliness of obtaining skills
and the distributions of job and worker types. We study the e¤ect of skill biased
technological change on job and worker distributions with alternative assumptions
on the skill costs. While unemployment increases in most scenarios, the e¤ect on
the distribution high and low skill vacancies, high and low skilled workers, both
among the total population and the unemployed, vary according to the structure
of skill costs.
We extend the model to investigate how job competition and skill biased tech-
nological change inuence labor market outcomes when also the labor market par-
ticipation margin is endogenous. In line with several earlier studies (e.g. McKenna
1987, Sattinger 1995) we assume that labor market participation depends posi-
tively on the value of being unemployed. The extended model with endogenous
labor market participation supports the claim of Murphy and Topel (1997) that the
unemployment rate has become less informative of the aggregate state of the labor
market. While skill biased technological change has modest e¤ects on unemploy-
ment in the model, the participation margin uctuates much more. In most cases
labor market participation decreases with skill biased technological change. We
conclude that the unemployment rate gives a misleading picture of the employment
e¤ects of skill biased technological change.
4 Labor Taxation, Equilibrium Unemployment,
and Macroeconomic Dynamics
The third essay (Chapter 4) investigates the e¤ects of labor taxes and labor tax
reform on equilibrium labor market outcomes and on the sensitivity of an economy
to macroeconomic shocks. First, the equilibrium labor market e¤ects of the struc-
ture of taxes and subsidies are considered. In particular interest is on the e¤ects of
changing the degree of tax progression on equilibrium labor market variables and
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output. Second, the potential importance of changes in tax structure and com-
pensation schemes for the sensitivity of the economy wrt. exogenous shocks are
considered.
For the purpose of analyzing the cyclical behavior of a relatively large set
of macroeconomic variables, a search-matching model of the labor market à la
Mortensen-Pissarides (e.g. Pissarides 2000, Mortensen and Pissarides 1999a) is
embedded into a New Keynesian monetary model (e.g. Woodford 2003). This
extension also allows the study of e.g. interest rate shocks.10 This study adopts
the view that business cycle uctuations inuence the reorganizational activity in
the economy, whereby low productivity job-worker matches are replaced by more
protable ones (see e.g. Hall (2000) and Caballero and Hammour (2005)). This
essay contributes to the recent literature that studies the role of matching frictions
and the role of factors that produce wage rigidity in improving the performance of
business cycle models
Three policy instruments are considered: a marginal tax rate and a tax subsidy
to produce tax progression schemes, and a replacement ratio to account for vari-
ability in outside options. In equilibrium, the marginal tax rate and replacement
ratio dampen economic activity whereas tax subsidies boost the economy. The mar-
ginal tax rate and replacement ratio amplify shock responses whereas employment
subsidies weaken them. The tax instruments a¤ect the degree to which the wage
absorbs shocks. It is shown that the relative e¤ects of the tax instruments and thus
the e¤ects of tax progression are sensitive to the initial degree of tax progression
in the economy. Increasing tax progression when taxation is initially progressive
is harmful for steady state employment and output, and amplies the sensitivity
of macroeconomic variables to shocks. When taxation is initially proportional, in-
creasing progression is benecial for output and employment and dampens shock
responses of macroeconomic variables.
A key issue in both the steady-state equilibrium analysis and the dynamic im-
pulse response analysis is the rigidity of the wage implied by the labor market
policy schemes wrt. to exogenous changes in the economy. Progressive taxation
essentially renders the wage less sensitive to exogenous shocks, thus shifting adjust-
ments in the labor market to other variables. This outcome relates to the above
mentioned Shimercritique of the Mortensen-Pissarides matching model, namely
that the model does not produce su¢ cient uctuations in vacancies and unemploy-
ment because the negotiated wage absorbs too much of the shocks of an economy.
10In the literature the cyclical properties of the Mortensen-Pissarides type model is often lim-
ited to the analysis of productivity shocks, and may thereby miss important mechanisms of the
economy.
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In the present study tax progression de facto makes the wage more rigid, producing
a qualitatively similar result to the wage norm solution proposed by Hall (2005)
and used by many others. The results are quantitatively not as strong, but no ad
hoc assumptions on the foundations of wage rigidity are needed.
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Chapter 2
Growth, Skill Mismatch and
Unemployment
Abstract
This paper extends the standard vintage capital/search model of Aghion
and Howitt (1994) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) to incorporate vin-
tage human capital and studies the impact of capital-embodied growth on
equilibrium unemployment. In addition to the capital obsolescence (or cre-
ative destruction) e¤ect that tends to raise unemployment, vintage human
capital introduces a skill obsolescence e¤ect of faster growth that has the
opposite sign. Faster skill obsolescence reduces the value of unemployment,
hence wages and leads to more job creation and less job destruction, unam-
biguously reducing unemployment.
1 Introduction
Economic growth is a process of continuous restructuring and factor reallocation.
Technological change, embodied in new generations of capital equipment, renders
previous vintages of machines obsolete and eliminates jobs associated to these tech-
nologies to be replaced by new ones. Such restructuring is often described by the
Schumpeterian notion of creative destruction, where new technology vintages enter
the economy replacing their predecessors. Vintage economies are characterized by
continuous large scale job creation and destruction, where workers from destroyed
jobs are reallocated to new jobs at the technological frontier.
The standard result in vintage capital/search models is that a faster rate of tech-
nological growth tends to increase equilibrium unemployment (Aghion and Howitt
This essay is an independent part of an ongoing more extensive research project conducted
jointly with Giovanni L. Violante.
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(1994) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1998)). In a vintage capital model, new more
productive technology vintages enter the economy, making older generations of cap-
ital relatively less productive. As workers operating old technology vintages may
potentially change to a job with a more productive and higher paying technology
vintage, the jobs with older technology vintages have to pay wages that take account
of this. Eventually the increasing wage drives old capital vintages unprotable and
these jobs are destroyed. A faster rate of growth increases the capital obsolescence
e¤ect that tends to shorten job durations and increase unemployment incidence.
These models implicitly assume that workers skills are fully transferable from older
technologies to cutting edge technologies. The reallocation of workers implies some
unemployment as matching workers to jobs involves frictions, but a factor that has
received little attention in vintage models is the evolution of workersskills and the
suitability of workers to the new jobs produced by the economy.
This paper extends the standard vintage capital-search model of Aghion and
Howitt (1994) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) to incorporate vintage human
capital. In addition to vintage capital and capital obsolescence present in earlier
models we introduce skill obsolescence of workers into the vintage framework. Work-
ers learn through learning-by-doing while employed, but their learning is specic
to the vintage of technology they operate. Upon separation, workers become un-
employed and search for a new job. The amount of skills they can transfer on the
new jobs (of the leading edge vintage) is proportional to the technological distance
between the old and the new capital they work with. While unemployed, skills keep
becoming obsolete.
We study the determination of unemployment following the long tradition of
works on growth and unemployment. We highlight a new channel for this inter-
action: as the rate of productivity growth increases, we not only have a capital
obsolescence e¤ect that tends to shorten job durations and increase unemployment
incidence, but we also have a skill obsolescence e¤ect that reduces the value of
unemployment and tends to o¤set the former force. We analyze job creation and
destruction on the assumption of skill obsolescence being independent of the rate of
technical change, and on the assumption that the rate of skill obsolescence and the
rate of technical change are related so that transferability is decreasing in the pro-
ductivity growth parameter. Since technological change both eliminates and creates
jobs, a search and matching models provide a natural framework for analysis.
The relationship between capital age and unemployment in the U.S. is illus-
trated in gure 1. The gure draws the rate of unemployment, the age of capital
equipment, which also measures job duration in the vintage model, and rate of
capital-embodied technical change for capital equipment. According to the stan-
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Figure 1: Unemployment, age of equipment, and technical change, U.S. 1960-1998.
dard vintage capital/search model, when the rate of technical change rises, the age
of capital falls (job durations fall) and unemployment increases. According to the
present model, if skill obsolescence dominates, when the rate of technical change
increases, the age of capital rises and unemployment falls. As the gure illustrates,
the data of age of capital and unemployment are consistent with both the standard
vintage capital model and the model with vintage human capital presented in this
paper However, when the rate of technical change is considered the model of the
present paper seems more plausible. Furthermore, it can be noted that wages in the
U.S. stagnated over the period 1975-1995 as well, which is consistent with a skill
obsolescence story.
In addition to the related studies on growth and unemployment (e.g. Aghion and
Howitt (1994) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1998)), a number of papers focus on
the interactions of technological change, skills and specicity. Caballero and Ham-
mour (1997, 1998a, 1998b) study the implications of specicity and appropriability
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of job specic rents in the context of growth and job reallocation. Embodiment of
technology in capital vintages and job specic human capital gives rise to appropri-
able quasi rents that distort job reallocation in the process of creative destruction.
Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) study the determination of equilibrium unemploy-
ment in a model where workers accumulate skills on the job and lose skills during
unemployment.1 Skill dynamics of this type are also present in Laing et al. (2003),
but they incorporate growth of the stock of public knowledge in the economy. They
introduce overlapping generations (vintages) of workers who di¤er in productivities
s.t. knowledge growth is embodied in new entrant workers. In this setup the entry
of new (younger) workers renders the knowledge of older workers obsolete. Galor
and Moav (2000) build a growth model which is characterized by ability biased
technological transition where technological acceleration leads to a rise in wage in-
equality both between and within skill groups. Their study is close in spirit to
the present paper, as technological progress is assumed to reduce the adaptability
of existing human capital for the new technological environment. While superior
technologies increase productivity, they also erode existing human capital that is
adaptable to the new technologies, thus reducing productivity. A characteristic of
their model is that able individuals have a comparative advantage in adapting to
new technology. Violante (2002) considers workers with two-dimensional skills. An
employed worker accumulates skills by learning-by-doing, but when changing jobs
to one of a more recent technological vintage, only a fraction of the workers skills
are transferable. Technological acceleration reduces workerscapacity to transfer
skills from old to new machines, generating cross-sectional variance of skills and
therefore wages. Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) and Violante (2002) do not study
the creative destruction -nature of technological change as their models do not
embed the vintage capital structure. Carré and Drouot (2004) introduce learning-
by-doing into a vintage capital framework but do not consider transferability of
skills between technology vintages.
We adopt the two-dimensional nature of skills (Violante 2002) into the vintage
matching framework. There are two technological parameters in the model, the
speed of technical change which measures the rate of capital obsolescence and skill
transferability which measures the rate of skill obsolescence. One can also conjecture
that the rate of skill obsolescence and the rate of technical change are related so
that transferability is decreasing in the productivity growth parameter. We think of
the productivity growth parameter as capturing the degree to which new features of
the technologies are embodied in capital, and therefore the extent to which capital
1Pissarides (1992) studies unemployment persistence in a model where skill loss during unem-
ployment has an adverse e¤ect on vacancy creation.
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is di¤erent across vintages.
First, assuming that skill transferability is independent of the rate of technical
change, an increase in the latter increases both unemployment incidence (the age
of jobs decreases) and unemployment duration (labor market tightness decreases).
Therefore the equilibrium unemployment rate unambiguously increases as in the
standard vintage model. An increase in the transferability parameter has the op-
posite e¤ect, both unemployment incidence and unemployment duration decrease
(job age and labor market tightness both increase) and equilibrium unemployment
decreases.
Next, we study the impact of an increase in the rate of technical change when
skill transferability is decreasing in the productivity growth parameter. We derive a
condition to distinguish between two cases: when skills depreciate su¢ ciently little
with the rate of technical change so that technological obsolescence dominates and
when skills depreciate fast enough with the rate of technical change so that skill
obsolescence dominates. For the former unemployment increases (job age and labor
market tightness both decrease) with an increase in the rate of technical change
and for the latter unemployment decreases (job age and labor market tightness
both increase). We conclude that the comparative static results of the standard
vintage capital are reversed when skill depreciation is fast enough.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the structure of the econ-
omy and the evolution of skills and productivity. In section 3 we characterize
the balanced growth equilibrium of the model and derive the two key equilibrium
conditions: the job creation and destruction conditions. Section 4 describes the
behavior of the economy wrt. growth and the key parameters of the model. Section
5 concludes.
2 The Economy
We rst describe the structure of the economy and the asset value equations that
characterize the ow returns to the rms and workers when participating in a match
and when idle. The key element in the structure of the economy is vintage human
capitalwhich interacts with technological vintage capital present in earlier studies.
Demographics and preferencesTime is continuous. The economy is populated
by a measure one of ex-ante equal workers, who are innitely lived, risk-neutral and
discount the future at rate r > 0: Every period, workers can be either employed or
unemployed. Workers retire exogenously at rate  > 0 and are replaced by a new
inow of unemployed workers of measure :
27
TechnologyNew technologies are embodied in physical capital, and the leading
edge technology in the economy advances at an exogenous rate  > 0. A rm (or
production unit, or machine) created at time t embeds a xed amount of capital
(normalized to unity) of vintage t with productivity et. Production is decentralized
across di¤erent rms and takes place when the rm is matched with a worker. Every
period, rms can be either vacant or matched. As standard in the literature, we
assume that all vacant rms at time t embody the best available technology.
SkillsHuman capital is partially vintage specic. New workers entering the
labor market at time t have skill level zt specic to the newest technology of vintage
t, i.e. the skill level zt measures the productivity of a worker operating capital
of vintage t: Over time these skills become obsolete with respect to more recent
technology vintages. We will assume that at time t, an unemployed worker with
skill level z of vintage  (s.t.  < t) can transfer skills zt < z on a new job with a
machine of the latest vintage t; where zt is determined by
zt = ze
 (t ): (1)
One may think of the parameter  as a measure of the vintage specicity of the
skills of a worker. A worker with a given productivity z in operating capital of
vintage  is less productive in operating capital of a more recent vintage t. The
larger is the distance between t and  ; the smaller is the fraction of skills that are
relevant or transferable to a more recent vintage t. Given that all vacancies at any
time t embody the best vintage of technology, it is convenient to express the skill
level of a worker z always in terms of the newest vintage t: This convention and
equation (1) imply that for unemployed workers, skills evolve (relative to the best
vintage of technology) according to the law of motion

z =  z, where the subscript
t is omitted to lighten the notation.
When employed, workers cumulate skills through learning-by-doing at the in-
stantaneous constant learning rate  > 0, therefore during employment the law of
motion for skills (expressed in terms of the newest vintage t) is

z = (  ) z. The
rate of skill obsolescence relative to the leading edge technology is thus lower for
employed workers than for unemployed workers, as skills not only depreciate relative
to new technology vintages, but also accumulate when employed.2 To avoid that
the skill space expands innitely, we make the convenient assumption   : With
2Separating the skill evolution parameters into the learning by doing  and depreciation 
parameters is to simplify intuition. Alternatively one could simply assume that skill obsolescence
i (i = e; u) is smaller for employed workers than for unemployed workers, because employed
accumulate skills (although their skills also depreciate relative to the most recent vintage).
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this assumption, the domain of the skill distribution is bounded between (0; z].3
At time t; output produced by a match between a machine of vintage  and a
worker of skills z (always expressed in terms of the newest vintage t) is
y (t;  ; z) = eze(t ); (2)
where e is the xed productivity of capital of vintage  ; z is the productivity of
the worker expressed in terms of the newest vintage t including learning by doing
up to date t; and e(t ) converts worker productivity to productivity in operating
capital of vintage  .4
MatchingFirms observe workersskills perfectly and they can direct their search
towards any type z; hence the matching markets will be segmented by skill level.
Firms pay a search cost
c (t; z) = zetc (3)
to search in market z. The search cost is proportional to the productivity of new
jobs in market z, reecting the realistic feature that job creation and recruiting
costs of high productivity jobs are larger than those of low productivity jobs. Each
of these matching markets has the same constant returns to scale matching func-
tion m (u(z); v(z)), where u (z) and v (z) are respectively unemployed workers and
vacancy rms in market z. We denote by (z) the vacancy-unemployment ratio (or
market tightness) in market z, p ( (z)) the meeting probability for an unemployed
worker and q ( (z)) the meeting probability for a vacant rm in market z. The
meeting rates imply an expected duration of search for rms of 1= q ( (z)) and an
expected duration of unemployment of 1= p ( (z)) in market z: Matches dissolve
exogenously at rate :
Workers incomeThe fractions of output going to wages and to prots along the
match are determined through Nash bargaining between the rm and the worker.
The pair rebargains every instant on the new discounted stream of output. De-
note the wage of a match between an employed worker with skill level z on a
machine of vintage  at time t as w (t;  ; z). Unemployed workers spend all their
time endowment searching, hence having no utility from leisure. They receive an
3It is important to make the distinction of vintage specicity of skills as opposed to match
specic skills. In this study, skills are specic to technology vintage, not to an individual match.
Therefore, as workers have an initial skill level zt when entering the labor market, even a worker
who has never been matched loses skills relative to the leading edge vintage. Match specic skills,
aquired in a match, would require a worker to have been matched before any skills could be lost.
4If the workers productivity is z on the leading edge capital vintage t; the term e(t ) is
included to reverse the skill depreciation over the period t   : The workers skills become obsolete
wrt. new technology vintages, but they do not depreciate wrt. to the current job of vintage  :
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unemployment income b (z; t) = zetb which is proportionate to the growth rate of
aggregate income and the evolution of workers skills. Interestingly, this assumption
implies that benets fall with unemployment duration, as in most of the real-world
unemployment insurance systems.
2.1 Value Functions and Match Surplus
The values of participating to the market for the rms and workers are described
by a set value equations. At time t, denote the value of vacant rms searching
in market z by V (t; z); the value of rms of vintage  matched with workers of
type z by J (t;  ; z); the value of employed workers in the same type of match by
W (t;  ; z) ; and the value of unemployed workers with skills z by U (t; z). Then, it
is easy to derive that5
rV (t; z) = max

c (t; z) + q ( (z)) [J (t; t; z)  V (t; z)] + dV (t; z)
dt
; 0

(4)
rJ (t;  ; z) = max
n
y (t;  ; z)  w (t;  ; z)  ( + )
h
J (t;  ; z) max
z
V (t; z)
i
(5)
+
dJ (t;  ; z)
dt
; rmax
z
V (t; z)

rW (t;  ; z) = max fw (t;  ; z)   [W (t;  ; z)  U (t; z)]  W (t;  ; z) (6)
+
dW (t;  ; z)
dt
; rU (t; z)

rU (t; z) = max fb (z; t) + p ( (z)) [W (t; t; z)  U (t; z)]  U (t; z) (7)
+
dU (t; z)
dt
; 0

where dV (t;z)
dt
= Vt (t; z) ;
dJ(t; ;z)
dt
= Jt (t;  ; z)+ _zJz (t;  ; z) and
dW (t; ;z)
dt
= Wt (t;  ; z)+
_zWz (t;  ; z) s:t:

z = (  ) z and dU(t;z)
dt
= Ut (t; z) + _zUz (t; z) s:t:

z =  z:6
5A typical derivation of a value equation (as limit of a discrete time model economy) is described
in the Appendix.
6Observe that whereas z evolves in time for a lled job, an employed worker and an unemployed
worker, it is constant in the value equation of a vacancy and dV (t;z)dt does not involve the e¤ect
through z:. This is because a rm posts a vacancy with a specic skill requirement z; for example
fresh high school graduates, and although the individuals in the pool of unemployed workers with
skills z come and go (new graduates with skills z enter and unemployed graduates of an earlier
vintage exit the pool as their skills depreciate over time), the pool where the rm searches and
therefore z remains the same.
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A vacant job in the market for skills z costs c (t; z) per unit time and the rm
matches with a worker at rate q ( (z)). The change of state yields a return of
J (t; t; z) V (t; z) to the rm. An occupied job yields the return y (t;  ; z) w (t;  ; z)
per unit time, which is the productive output of the match minus the wage paid
to the worker. The job may be terminated due to either an exogenous shock or
retirement at the respective rates  and . The value of the match depends on the
skills of the worker, which evolve according to the law of motion

z = (  ) z: The
worker accumulates skills at rate  as long as the rm and worker are matched and
the workers skills depreciate relative to the newest technology vintage at rate .
When employed a worker earns the wage w (t;  ; z) per unit time. The match
may be destroyed due to an exogenous shock at rate  in which case the worker
becomes unemployed and loses the di¤erence between the two labor market states
W (t;  ; z) U (t; z) : In the case of retirement which occurs at rate  the worker loses
W (t;  ; z) : The evolution of skills for an employed worker follows the law of motion

z = (  ) z. An unemployed worker receives an unemployment income b (z; t) and
matches with a rm at rate p ( (z)) which yields a return ofW (t; t; z) U (t; z) : In
the case of retirement the worker loses U (t; z) :When unemployed, skills depreciate
according to the law of motion

z =  z as no skill accumulation takes place.
Note that the value of unemployment U (t; z) for an employed worker in equation
(6) evolves according to

z = (  ) z: This is so because as long as a worker is
employed, also the value of eventual unemployment is a¤ected by skill accumulation
on the job.
3 Balanced Growth Equilibrium
We now characterize the equilibrium of the model, along a balanced growth path
where all the values above grow at rate . Once we stationarize all values by the
growth factor et all the relevant equilibrium objects are only a function of the
di¤erence (t  ) which is age and we denote as a: The balanced growth path
versions of the value equations are7
(r   )V (z) = max f zc+ q ( (z)) [J (0; z)  V (z)] ; 0g (8)
(r   ) J (a; z) = max
n
e azea   w (a; z)  ( + )
h
J (a; z) max
z
V (z)
i
(9)
+Ja (a; z) + (  ) zJz (a; z) ; (r   )max
z
V (z)
o
7See appendix for details.
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(r   )W (a; z) = max fw (a; z)   [W (a; z)  U (z)]  W (a; z) (10)
+Wa (a; z) + (  ) zWz (a; z) ; (r   )U (z)g
(r   )U (z) = max fbz + p ( (z)) [W (0; z)  U (z)]  U (z) (11)
 zUz (z) ; 0g
Intuitively, these equations are expressed in terms of age relative to the leading
edge technology vintage of age zero. For example, technological productivity e a
in equation (9) decreases with age relative to the leading edge technology.
The key object for the characterization of the model is the surplus function,
dened as the value of the match for a worker and a rm, net of their respective
outside options. The surplus of a match of age a is given by
S (a; z) = J (a; z) +W (a; z)  V (z)  U (z) : (12)
The worker and the rm divide the match surplus according to the Nash bargaining
solution and the rst-order condition is
 [J (a; z;w (a; z))  V (z)] = (1  ) [W (a; z;w (a; z))  U (a; z)] : (13)
where  represents the workers share of match surplus. The division of the match
surplus is continuously renegotiated s.t. it reects the evolution of match surplus
over time. Substitution of the value equations into the rst-order condition yields
the wage equation8
w (a; z) = ze( )a + (1  ) z

b+

1   c (z)

: (14)
The rst term is the workers share of match output. Relative to productivity
in leading edge technology jobs, technological productivity decreases with age a:
As z measures the productivity of a worker in a leading edge job, ea reverses
skill depreciation, as skill depreciation does not take place as long as the worker
continues working with the current technology of age a:9 The second term reects
the workers outside option and is expressed in terms of the leading edge vintage.
It depends on the unemployment compensation received by unemployed workers of
skills z and labor market tightness.
It is useful to formally dene a stationary equilibrium for this economy.
Denition: A stationary (stationarized balanced growth) equilibrium is a list of:
(i) values fV (z) ; U (z) ; J (a; z) ;W (a; z) ; S (a; z)g ; (ii) market tightness function
; (iii) optimal destruction age a; (iv) wage function w (a; z) such that:
8See appendix for detailed derivation.
9Recall that z includes learning by doing over the age of the match.
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1. The values fV (z) ; J (a; z) ;W (a; z) ; U (z)g satisfy equations (8) (12) above;
2. There is free entry of vacancies in each market z, thus equilibrium market
tightness  satises the condition V (z) = 0;
3. The optimal destruction age a satises the condition S 0 (a; z) = 0;
4. The wage function w (a; z) solves the Nash bargaining equation (13).
3.1 Characterization
Substituting the value equations (9) ; (10) and the value of unemployment for an
employed worker (with the law of motion _z = (  ) z) into (12) and using V (z) =
0 produces10
(r    +  + )S (a; z) = maxze( )a   bz   p ( (z)) S (0; z) (15)
+Sa (a; z) + (  ) zSz (a; z)g :
To see that the surplus (15) is a rst order di¤erential equation as a function
of t; observe that S (a; z) = S (a (t) ; z (t)) and consequently we can express the
derivatives dS(a(t);z(t))
dt
= Sa (a; z) + (  ) zSz (a; z) ; recall that _z = (  ) z:
From the denition of the surplus and the Nash condition we obtain S (0; z) =
1
1 J (0; z) and using the free entry condition in (8) we get J (0; z) =
cz
q((z))
: Then
(15) reduces to11
(r    +  + )S (a; z)  dS (a; z)
dt
= max

ze( )a   bz   
1   cz (z) ; 0

: (16)
This is a rst order di¤erential equation for the surplus as a function of t: The
max operator implies that we have a boundary condition S (a; z) = 0. The partic-
ular solution for this di¤erential equation, once we impose the boundary condition,
is
S (a; z) = e( )az
Z a
a

1  ! () e ( )~a e (r++ )(~a a)d~a (17)
where ! () = b + 
1  c is the outside option of the worker. From the optimality
condition S 0 (a) = 0, it follows that the destruction age a for the matched pair
satises the following rule:
e( )a = ! () (18)
10See appendix for details.
11Here we have also used the properies of the matching function p((z))q((z)) = :
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This condition is very intuitive and can be explained in two alternative ways. First,
let us rewrite the equation above as
zea = ea! () ze( )a:
The left hand side of that expression is the output ow on a machine of age a
matched with a worker who had skills z upon matching; the right hand side is the
ow value of the outside option of the same worker (recall the outside option of
the rm V is zero in equilibrium): her skills have increased at the pace  but, at
the same time, became obsolete at rate : The term ea represents the higher value
of job opportunities today compared to a periods ago thanks to the growth of the
leading edge technology at rate :12
Second, one can provide an interpretation in terms of the wage w (a) : Using
(18) in the wage equation (??) it is now immediate to derive that w (a) = e( )a.
In other words, at age a all output is claimed by the worker as wage bill and no
more prots can be generated, so the job is destroyed endogenously.
It is important to remark that (18) implies that in order to have a meaningful
economic problem, we need to assume throughout that  > . If   , then
jobs are never destroyed endogenously, as the surplus will rise with age (instead of
declining as usual in this class of models) because the value of unemployment falls
faster than output, due to skill obsolescence.13
Now that we have derived a solution for the surplus function, we can show that
the model can be reduced to two equations into the pair of unknowns (; a). The
rst equation, the job creation condition, is derived from free entry in equilibrium;
the second equation, the job destruction condition, is derived from the optimal
separation rule for a match.
3.2 Job Creation condition
The rst equation follows directly from the free entry condition V (z) = 0, which
implies J (0) = c=q (). Using J (a; z) = (1  )S (a; z) and the denition of the
surplus in (17) evaluated at a = 0, together with the destruction rule that we use
to eliminate ! () from (??)we arrive at
c
(1  ) q () =
Z a
0

1  e ( )(a ~a) e (r++ )~ad~a (19)
12Note that since learning by doing increases both the productivity in the current job and the
outside option of the employed worker, it cancels out and does not feature in the job destruction
condition (18) :
13Jobs would still be destroyed endogeneously if the worker had a positive return from nonpar-
ticipating which is independent of her skill level z. The model would generate direct ows from
employment to out-of-the labor force. This is discussed in Vanhala and Violante (2005) in detail.
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which characterizes the optimal entry decisions of rms in each of the z markets.
Notice that it is an equation in both a and  and that it is positively sloped in the
(; a) space: q0 () < 0 and the right-hand-side of the expression above is increasing
in a: To see that, solve explicitly the right-hand-side to obtain
S (0; a) =
1
r +  +   
 
1  e (r++ )a (20)
  1
r +  +      + 

e ( )a   e (r++ )a
and di¤erentiate wrt. a, which gives
@S (0; a)
@a
=
1
r +  +      +  (   ) e
 ( )a 1  e [r++  ( )]a > 0;
thus the surplus at age zero is increasing in the destruction threshold a. The
intuition for why the job creation curve is positively sloped is simple: the surplus
function is increasing in a thus an increase in a makes the marginal job created
protable, and more vacancies will be opened to restore the zero-prot condition
(and reduce the meeting probability for the rm), which will increase .14
Let us study the behavior of the curve as  ! 0 (i.e. q ()!1 ): the left-hand-
side of (19) goes to zero, and the equation states that S (0; a) = 0, i.e. amin = 0: In
other words, as the hiring friction disappears, and the rm instantaneously nds new
workers, machines will be constantly updated.15 To see what happens as a ! 1,
use the solution for S (0; a) in (20) to obtain
c
(1  ) q (max) =
1
r +  +    ) 
max = q 1

c (r +  +   )
1  

:
In other words, even if the job tenure is innitely long, the rm needs a minimum
meeting rate to recoup the ow vacancy cost c: Figure 2 shows the job creation
curve in the (; a) space.
3.3 Job Destruction condition
The outside option in the optimal separation condition (18) is equal to the value of
unemployment for an employed worker and may be expressed in terms of the match
surplus. The separation rule may thus be expressed as16
14A second reason often cited in the literature, namely that a longer job duration increases the
length over which a positive ow surplus accrues to the pair is not true. This is because a is
chosen optimally by the rm, and by the envelope theorem this e¤ect is zero.
15Recall that in this model the cost of a new machine is zero, but scrapping an old machine
to buy a new one implies separation from the worker. Hence insofar as looking for a new worker
takes time, upgrading is costly.
16See appendix for details.
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e ( )a = b+ p () S (0; a) ; (21)
Substituting the expression for the surplus (??) evaluated at a = 0; and using (18)
we obtain the job destruction condition
e ( )a = b+ p () 
Z a
0

1  e ( )(a ~a) e (r++ )~ad~a; (22)
which traces a negatively sloped curve in the (; a) space. The intuition for the
negative slope is that a rise in a reduces the productivity of the marginal job, but
it also raises the value of unemployment, as the value of search rises, thus for the
destruction rule to be restored, the workersmeeting rate has to fall, so  has to
fall.
Consider the situation where  ! 0 (i.e. p () ! 0 ), then we have an upper
bound for the destruction age
amax =   ln b
   
which is a positive number since b < 1.17 In other words, when the workers
meeting rate is extremely small, the option value of search does not a¤ect the joint
destruction decision, only the welfare benet does.
3.4 Equilibrium Unemployment
In steady state unemployment is constant and the ow of job creation must equal
the ow of job destruction. Job creation is given by the ow of new matches
JC = m (u; v) =
Z z
0
m (u (z) ; v (z)) dz:
Jobs are destroyed either endogenously or exogenously
JD = 

1 
Z z
0
u (z) dz

+ e a
Z z
0
m (u (z) ; v (z)) dz
where we have normalized the labor force to one. A fraction  of employed workers
become unemployed due to exogenous job destruction. A fraction e a of matches
survive until the age of obsolescence and are then destroyed endogenously.
To derive the aggregate unemployment rate denote u = u (z) ; v = v (z) and
m (u; v) =
R z
0
m (u (z) ; v (z)) dz:In steady state JC = JD so we have
m (u; v) =  (1  u) + e am (u; v) (23)
17This has to be true in a viable labor market where the normalized productivity of the best
vintage is 1:
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JC
JD
ā
āmax
θmax θ
Figure 2: Job creation and destruction
where 1  u = e: Rearranging produces
p ()u
 
1  e a =  (1  u) (24)
where p ()u = m (u; v) by the properties of the matching function. Rearranging
gives the equilibrium unemployment rate
u =

 + p () (1  e a) (25)
The equilibrium unemployment rate is decreasing in age a and labor market tight-
ness : This is intuitive as higher a implies lower unemployment incidence and
higher  implies shorter unemployment duration.
4 Equilibrium Comparative Statics
There are two key technological parameters in the model, the speed of technical
change  which measures the rate of capital obsolescence and the rate of skill ob-
solescence . Recall that the parameter  should be interpreted as a measure of
specicity of skills: a large value of  implies vintage specic skills, whereas a low
value of  means general skills that are largely transferable to other job vintages.
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We start by the simplest case, whereby  is independent of : Alternatively, one can
reasonably conjecture that  and  are related by the function  (), with 0 > 0.
In other words, transferability is decreasing in the productivity growth parameter
 as, for example, in Galor and Moav (2000), Violante (2002), and Gould, Moav
and Weinberg (2001).18 We proceed by rst examining the e¤ect of the technolog-
ical parameters on market tightness and the destruction age, then we consider the
e¤ects on equilibrium unemployment.
4.1 The E¤ects on (; a)
The impact of Lets start with the e¤ect of the rate of technical change  on
the surplus function S (0; a) : Di¤erentiating (20) ; we obtain
@S (0; a)
@
=
e ( )a

[r +  +     (   )] a+ e (r++  +)a   1	
(r +  +      + )2 > 0
where the inequality follows from the fact that
1  e (r++  +)a
r +  +      +  =
Z a
0
e (r++  +)xdx < a
as the argument of the integral is strictly less than 1 everywhere on the domain
[0; a]. Therefore, the job creation curve (19) shifts downward: for a given contact
rate , the faster technical change increases the value of the surplus, thus a has to
fall to rebalance the job creation condition.
It is easy to see that the job destruction curve (22) shifts downwards as well: the
rise in the surplus raises the value of unemployment, for given : At the same time,
the marginal value of a job e a falls, thus the meeting probability has to decline
as well to rebalance this condition. In conclusion, we have an unambiguous rise
in unemployment incidence (a decreases) but ambiguous e¤ects on unemployment
duration (expected unemployment duration is given by 1=p ()):
The impact of Consider now a change in the transferability parameter :
From the surplus function
@S (0; a)
@
=
 e ( )a [r +  +      + ] a+ e (r++  +)a   1	
(r +  +      + )2 < 0;
18We think of  as capturing the degree to which new features of the technologies are embodied
in capital, and therefore the extent to which capital is di¤erent across vintages. Note that  is
often measured through quality-adjusted relative prices, consistently with this view. This e¤ect
is called in the literature the human capital erosion e¤ectdue to faster growth .
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Figure 3: Equilibrium comparative statics.
thus following the same logic we have used above, it is easy to show that both
curves shift upward, leading to a rise in a (and a fall in unemployment incidence)
and ambiguous e¤ects on unemployment duration.
The impact of  when  depends on The derivative of the surplus
becomes
@S (0; a)
@
=
[1  0 ()] e ( )a [r +  +     (    ())] a+ e [r++  ( ())]a   1	
[r +  +      +  ()]2
which is positive when 0 () < 1 and negative when 0 () > 1: For example,
suppose that  () = : Then the assumption  () <  implies that  < 1 and
0 () < 1. Thus, when  is linear, the comparative statics are like in the case where
 is independent of . However, when nonlinearities are present and 0 () > 1, we
can have a situation where @S(0;a)
@
< 0 and a rise in  has the same comparative
statics as a rise in . In this case the specicity of skills increases and consequently
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the transferability of skills is reduced with the rate of technical change.
The impact of Finally consider a change in the learning rate : The deriv-
ative of the surplus function is
@S (0; a)
@
=
 ae (r+ )a (r +  +   ) + 1  e (r++ )a
(r +  +   )2
 e ( )a 
1  e [r++  ( )]a   ae [r++  ( )]a [r +  +     (   )]
[r +  +     (   )]2
which is easily seen to be positive. Again, following the same logic we have used
above, we can show that both the job creation and destruction curves shift down-
wards. Unemployment incidence increases (a decreases) and the e¤ect on unem-
ployment duration is ambiguous.
4.2 The E¤ects on Equilibrium Unemployment
The job creation and destruction conditions derived above produce unambiguous
comparative statics for a and unemployment incidence. However the comparative
statics with respect to  and unemployment duration remain ambiguous. To de-
termine the e¤ects of (; ; ) on  express the equilibrium job creation condition
c=q () = (1  )S (0) as
c
q ()
= (1  )
Z a
0

1  e( )~a

b+

1   c

e (r++ )~ad~a: (26)
This equation allows us to perform simply the comparative statics on  since it is
(locally) independent of a due to the envelope theorem. It is therefore easy to show
that
d
d
< 0,
d
d
> 0;
d
d
> 0:
Thus we conclude that an increase in the rate of technical change  raises both
unemployment incidence (a decreases) and unemployment duration ( decreases),
and the equilibrium unemployment rate unambiguously increases. An increase in
the transferability parameter  has the opposite e¤ect: both unemployment inci-
dence and unemployment duration decrease (a and  both increase), and equilib-
rium unemployment decreases. Finally, an increase in the learning rate  increases
unemployment incidence by reducing a; and reduces unemployment duration by
increasing  with ambiguous e¤ect on the equilibrium unemployment rate.
To see the impact of  when  depends on ; it is enough to recognize from
(26) thatd

d
and d

d
are equal in absolute value. When 0 () > 1, the indirect
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e¤ect of  through skill obsolescence dominates and a technological acceleration
reduces unemployment. When 0 () < 1 the direct e¤ect of  through technolog-
ical obsolescence dominates and we have the standard result that a technological
acceleration increases unemployment.
These results have a very intuitive interpretation. A higher rate of technical
change increases the value of frontier jobs relative to older vintages. In the stan-
dard vintage capital-search model this increases the workers outside option. The
consequent higher wage demands of workers and less protable rms leads to less
job creation and more job destruction, leading ultimately to higher equilibrium un-
employment. The skill obsolescence e¤ect counteracts this mechanism, by reducing
the outside value of the worker relative to the current job. This is because skills are
not fully transferable to new jobs. When the skill obsolescence e¤ect dominates,
workers settle for lower wages, which implies more protable rms and ultimately
higher equilibrium unemployment.
5 Concluding Remarks
Models on growth and unemployment (eg. Aghion and Howitt 1994, Mortensen
and Pissarides 1998) have focused on the creative destruction-nature of technical
change that takes place as new capital vintages replace old ones. The capital ob-
solescence e¤ect present in these models governs job creation and destruction, as
jobs are destroyed along with the obsolete capital they are matched with and new
jobs are created at the technological frontier where new capital is introduced. This
paper extends the standard vintage capital/search model to incorporate vintage
human capital by introducing skill obsolescence. The novel feature of the present
model is that workers skills are two-dimensional: skill accumulation and depreci-
ation take place simultaneously. During the lifetime of a job workers accumulate
skills that are relevant to the capital they currently operate, but these skills are
only partially transferable to jobs of more recent capital vintages. Therefore, as job
tenure increases so does the distance to the technological frontier where new jobs
are created.
In addition to the capital obsolescence (or creative destruction) e¤ect that tends
to raise unemployment, vintage human capital introduces a skill obsolescence e¤ect
of faster growth that has the opposite sign. Faster skill obsolescence reduces the
value of unemployment, hence wages and leads to more job creation and less job
destruction, unambiguously reducing unemployment.
The search model with vintage human capital presented in this study provides
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a framework to study questions pertaining to the impact of capital-embodied tech-
nological change on important labor market equilibrium outcomes such as the skill
distribution and inequality in the wage distribution and labor market participa-
tion. An important extension to the presented model is to allow for the updating
of capital in existing matches. Issues related to the determination of reservation
wages and accepting jobs as well as search intensity provide interesting topics for
extensions of the model.
An interesting extension to the matching model with vintage human capital
is to study the labor force participation decision of workers when nonemployment
involves an income unconditional on search. In the presence of an income from
home-production, or a welfare payment unconditional on search, the model implies
that some workers will choose optimally to exit the labor force because their skills
have depreciated so much that their value of searching is below what is o¤ered as
non-participants. Murphy and Topel (1998) show that in synchrony with the rise
of inequality, a larger fraction among the low-skilled agents have left the labor force
for good. They have argued that the same labor demand shift is responsible for
both. In the present model, a rise in the productivity growth of new capital in-
creases the rate of obsolescence of skill, so it might lead in equilibrium to a larger
fraction of agents whose skills end up commanding a wage lower than the value of
nonparticipation. The participation decision depends on the threat point of the em-
ployed worker, whether it is unemployment or nonparticipation. The various cases
of vintage human capital and nonparticipation are considered in ongoing research
(Vanhala and Violante 2005).
A Appendix
A.1 Derivation of a typical value equation
A typical derivation of the value equations goes as follows. Consider the value of
a vacant job. The strategy is to write the functions in discrete time, with interval
length dt and take the limit as dt approaches zero.
V (t; z) = max

1
1 + rdt
Z t+dt
t
 y (x; z) cdx+ q () dtJ (t+ dt; t+ dt; z)
+ (1  q () dt)V (t+ dt; z)] ; 0g
(1 + rdt)V (t; z) = max
Z t+dt
t
 y (x; z) cdx+ q () dtJ (t+ dt; t+ dt; z)
+ (1  q () dt)V (t+ dt; z)] ; 0g
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Multiplying both sides by (1 + rdt), subtracting V (t; z) from both sides and
dividing by dt, we obtain
rV (t; z) = max
("R t+dt
t
 y (x; z) cdx
dt
+ q () [J (t+ dt; t+ dt; z)  V (t+ dt; z)]
+
V (t+ dt; z)  V (t; z)
dt

; 0

(27)
where R t+dt
t
 y (x; z) cdx
dt
=
  R t+dt
t
exzcdx
dt
=
 etzc


edt   1
dt

:
We now take limits as dt! 0 for each component of (27). To begin with,
lim
dt!0
 etzc


edt   1
dt

=
 etzc

 =  etzc =  y (t; z) ;
where we have made use of De LHopital rule for the term

edt   1
dt

: Moreover,
lim
dt!0
[J (t+ dt; t+ dt; z)  V (t+ dt; z)] = J (t; t; z)  V (t; z) :
Furthermore, we have
V1 (t; z) = lim
dt!0
V (t+ dt; z)  V (t; z)
dt
:
Therefore, rV (t; z) in (27) simplies to
rV (t; z) = max f[ y (t; z) + q () [J (t; t; z)  V (t; z)] + V1 (t; z)] ; 0g :
A.2 Wage equation
The wage is given by the Nash bargaining solution and maximizes
w (a; z) = argmax [J (a; z)  V (z)]1  [W (a; z)  U (z)] : (28)
Observe that in this condition U (z) is the value of unemployment for an employed
worker and is thus a¤ected by both learning by doing  and skill depreciation .
Therefore the law of motion for U (z) in (28) is _z = (  ) z:
The rst order condition, given V (z) = 0; is
(1  ) @J (a; z)
@w (a; z)
[J (a; z)  V (z)]  [W (a; z)  U (z)]
+
@W (a; z)
@w (a; z)
[J (a; z)  V (z)]1  [W (a; z)  U (z)] 1
= 0 (29)
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Divide both sides by [J (a; z)  V (z)]  [W (a; z)  U (z)] 1 and use @W (a;z)
@w(a;z)
=
  @J(a;z)
@w(a;z)
to get
J (a; z) = (1  ) [W (a; z)  U (z)] : (30)
By substitution from equations (9), where y (a; z) = ze( )a, and (10) and using
the free-entry condition V (z) = 0; we obtain


ze( )a   w (a; z) + Jt (a; z) + _zJz (a; z)
r +  + 

(31)
= (1  )

w (a; z) + U (z) +Wt (a; z) + _zWz (a; z)
r +  + 
  U (z)

;
which by cancelling terms and rearranging gives
w (a; z) = ze( )a + (1  ) (r + )U (z) (32)
+ [Jt (a; z) + _zJz (a; z)]  (1  ) [Wt (a; z) + _zWz (a; z)]
Substitute the value equation for unemployment for an employed worker to get
w (a; z) = eze(t ) + (1  )bzet + p ( (z)) [W (0; z)  U (z)]	 (33)
+ [Jt (a; z) + _zJz (a; z)]
  (1  ) [Wt (a; z) + _zWz (a; z)  Ut (z)  _zUz (z)]
As the value of unemployment in the wage bargain is that of an employed worker,
observe that all the values J (a; z) ;W (a; z) and U (z) have the law of motion _z =
(  ) z:
Using the rst order condition (30) to cancel the derivative terms we obtain
w (a; z) = ze( )a + (1  ) fbz + p ( (z)) [W (0; z)  U (z)]g (34)
By the rst order condition W (0; z) U (z) = 
1 J (0; z), and V (z) = 0 in (8) im-
plies J (0; z) = zc
q()
: Substituting into (34) and using the properties of the matching
function the wage equation reduces to
w (a; z) = ze( )a + (1  ) z

b+

1   c

: (35)
A.3 Match Surplus
To derive the equations (8)  (11) given in the text, substitute (2), (3) and (14) into
the value equations (4)   (7) and stationarize the equations. Along the balanced
growth path all the values above grow at rate . Let a = t   denote the age of the
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production unit. Hence, it follows that V (t; z) = etV (z), with Vt (t; z) = etV (z);
J (t;  ; z) = etJ (a; z), with Jt (t;  ; z) = etJ (a; z) + etJa (a; z); W (t;  ; z) =
etW (a; z), with Wt (t;  ; z) = etW (a; z) + etWa (a; z); U (t; z) = etU (z), with
Ut (t; z) = e
tU (z). Finally, we have w (t;  ; z) = etw (a; z) = etzw (a).
The balanced growth path versions of the value equations are (after some ma-
nipulation)
(r   )V (z) = max f zc+ q ( (z)) [J (0; z)  V (z)] ; 0g (36)
(r   ) J (a; z) = max
n
e azea   w (a) z   ( + )
h
J (a; z) max
z
V (z)
i
(37)
+Ja (a; z) + (  ) zJz (a; z) ; (r   )max
z
V (z)
o
(r   )W (a; z) = max fw (a) z    [W (a; z)  U (z)]  W (a; z) (38)
+Wa (a; z) + (  ) zWz (a; z) ; (r   )U (z)g
(r   )U (z) = max fbz + p ( (z)) [W (0; z)  U (z)]  U (z) (39)
 zUz (z) ; 0g
Substituting the value equations (37) ; (38) and the value of unemployment for an
employed worker (with the law of motion _z = (  ) z) into (12), using V (z) = 0
and the denition of surplus produces
(r    +  + )S (a; z) = maxe( )az   bz   p ( (z)) [W (0; z)  U (z)](40)
+Ja (a; z) + (  ) zJz (a; z)
+Wa (a; z) + (  ) zWz (a; z)
  (  ) zUz (z) ; 0g :
Use the the Nash rst order condition to substitute [W (0; z)  U (z)] = S (0; z)
and denition of surplus to combine the derivative terms to obtain
(r    +  + )S (a; z) = maxe( )az   bz   p ( (z)) S (0; z) (41)
+Sa (a; z) + (  ) zSz (a; z)g :
To see that (41) is a rst order di¤erential equation as a function of t; observe that
S (a; z) = S (a (t) ; z (t)) and consequently we can express the derivatives Sa (a; z)+
(  ) zSz (a; z) = dS(a(t);z(t))dt ; recall that _z = (  ) z: Furthermore, use the Nash
condition S (0; z) = 1
1 J (0; z) and the free entry condition V (z) = 0 in the value
equation for J (0; z) to get J (0; z) = cz
q((z))
to obtain
(r    +  + )S (a; z)  dS (a; z)
dt
= max

e( )az   bz   
1   cz (z) ; 0

(42)
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where we have used the properties of the matching function to produce p((z))
q((z))
=
 (z) : This equation is a rst order di¤erential equation for the surplus as a function
of t:
Note that z represents the skills of a worker on the current leading edge tech-
nology, in terms of which the unemployment compensation b and search cost c are
expressed. However, as the worker in a match of age a operates capital of that age,
z is augmented by the factor ea in the rst right-hand-side term.
The max operator implies that we have a boundary condition S (a; z) = 0. The
general solution for the di¤erential equation, using ! () z = bz+ 
1  cz (z), for the
surplus is
S (a; z) = Ae (r ++)a 
+
Z a
a

e ~aeaze(~a a)   ! () ze( )(~a a) e (r ++)(~a a)d~a
Note that in the rst term in the integral, worker productivity is constant over time
(eaz), except for learning by doing from age a onwards
 
e(~a a)

: In the second
term in the integral, e( )(~a a) accounts for the workers skills depreciating at rate
 relative to the newest technology and accumulating by learning by doing at rate
 from age a onwards, from the initial level z: Divide and multiply by e( )(~a a) to
get
S (a; z) = Ae (r ++)a 
+
Z a
a

e ~aeaze(~a a)e ( )(~a a)   ! () z e (r +++ )(~a a)d~a
and cancel terms
S (a; z) = Ae (r ++)a 
+
Z a
a

e( )~az   ! () z e (r +++ )(~a a)d~a
Using the boundary condition S (a; z) = 0 implies that we must have A = 0 as
the integral term in the di¤erential equation is equal to zero at a: Therefore after
rearranging, we obtain,
S (a; z) = e( )az
Z a
a

e( )(~a a)   ! () e ( )a e (r +++ )(~a a)d~a
Divide and multiply by e( )(~a a) to get
S (a; z) = e( )az
Z a
a

1  ! () e ( )~a e (r++ )(~a a)d~a: (43)
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A.3.1 Job Creation
Using the Nash rst order condition and the free entry condition we obtain the job
creation condition from (36)
c
q ()
= e( )a
Z a
a

1  ! () e ( )~a e (r++ )(~a a)d~a
where z cancels out from both sides which is independent of z: This equation im-
plicitly solves ; and is a function of the destruction age a and the parameters of
the model. z does not feature in this equation.
Furthermore, using ! () = b+ 
1  c the job destruction condition is given by
e( )a = b+

1   c
or
a =   1
    ln

b+

1   c

(44)
Substitute this for a in the job creation condition. The resulting equation implic-
itly solves  as a function of the parameters of the model and this equation is
independent of z:
A.3.2 Job Destruction
The outside option in the optimal separation condition (18) is equal to the value of
unemployment for an employed worker
! () = b+

1   c = b+

1  p ()
c
q ()
where the last equality follows the properties of the matching function. Use J (0; a) =
c
q()
and the Nash rst-order condition to get
! () = b+ p () [W (0; z)  U (z)] (45)
or
! () = b+ p () S (0; a) : (46)
The value equation for an employed is given by
(r    + +   )U (z) = b+ p () S (0) ; (47)
hence the outside option is equal to the value of unemployment for an employed
worker.19
19The value of unemployment for an employed worker includes learning by doing as discussed
above, hence the term .
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Substituting (46) into (18) gives
e ( )a = b+ p () S (0; a) : (48)
Substituting the expression for the surplus (17) evaluated at a = 0; and using (18)
we obtain the job destruction condition
e ( )a = b+ p () 
Z a
0

1  e ( )(a ~a) e (r++ )~ad~a; (49)
References
[1] Aghion, Philippe and Peter Howitt (1994): Growth and Unemployment. Re-
view of Economic Studies, 61, 477-494.
[2] Caballero, Ricardo J. and Mohamad L. Hammour (1996): On the Timing
and E¢ ciency of Creative Destruction. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
August 1996, 805-852.
[3] Caballero, Ricardo J. and Mohamad L. Hammour (1998): Jobless Growth:
Appropriability, Factor Substitution and Unemployment. Carnegie-Rochester
Conference Series on Public Policy, vol. 48, Issue 1, 51-94.
[4] Caballero, Ricardo J. and Mohamad L. Hammour (1998b): The Macroeco-
nomics of Specicity. Journal of Political Economy, vol. 106, no. 4, 724-767.
[5] Carré, Martine and David Drouot (2004): Pace versus type: the e¤ect of
economic growth on unemployment and wage patterns, Review of Economic
Dynamics, 7, 737-757.
[6] Galor, Oded and Omer Moav (2000): Ability-biased Technological Transition,
Wage Inequality, and Economic Growth. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
vol. 115(1), May 2000, 469-497.
[7] Gould, Eric D., Omer Moav and Bruce A. Weinberg (2001): Precautionary De-
mand for Education, Inequality, and Technological Progress. Journal of Eco-
nomic Growth, 6(4), 285-315.
[8] Laing, Derek, Theodore Palivos and Ping Wang (2003): The Economics of
New Blood. Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 112, issue 1, pages 106-156.
[9] Ljungqvist, Lars and Thomas J. Sargent (1998): The European unemployment
dilemma. Journal of Political Economy, 106, 514-550.
48
[10] Mortensen, Dale T. and Christopher A. Pissarides (1998): Technological
progress, job creation and job destruction. Review of Economic Dynamics,
1, 733-753.
[11] Murphy, Kevin M. and Robert Topel (1998): Unemployment and Nonemploy-
ment (in Persistent Unemployment). The American Economic Review, Vol. 87,
No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Hundred and Fourth Annual Meeting of
the American Economic Association. (May, 1997), pp. 295-300.
[12] Pissarides, Christopher A. (1992): Loss of Skills During Unemployment and
the Persistence of Shocks. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 107(4),
November 1992, 1371-1391.
[13] Vanhala, Juuso and Giovanni L. Violante (2005): Growth and Nonemployment:
A Search Model with Vintage Human Capital. mimeo.
[14] Violante, Giovanni L. (2002): Technological Acceleration, Skill Transferability
and the Rise of Residual Inequality. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol.
117(1), February 2002, 297-338.
49
Chapter 3
Skill Biased Technological Change, Skill
Determination and Labor Market
Participation
Abstract
This paper studies the e¤ect of skill biased technological change on skill
mismatch and the allocation of workers and rms in the labor market. By
allowing workers to invest in education, we extend a matching model with
two-sided heterogeneity to incorporate an endogenous distribution of high and
low skill workers. We consider various possibilities for the cost of acquiring
skills and show that the skill cost is a key element in determining the e¤ects
of skill biased technological change on labor market variables. While unem-
ployment increases in most scenarios, the e¤ect on the distribution of vacancy
and worker types varies according to the structure of skill costs. When the
model is extended to incorporate endogenous labor market participation, we
show that the unemployment rate becomes less informative of the state of
the labor market as the participation margin absorbs employment e¤ects of
skill biased technological change.
1 Introduction
Most OECD countries have experienced a structural change in both the supply and
demand for skills over the last three decades. Universally a strong shift in demand
for more highly educated labor has occurred, which is to a large degree associated
with skill-biased technological change. At the same time the educational level of
workers has increased. Changes in the supply of labor have varied more between
countries, but a strong trend toward an increased proportion of workers with college
training is universal in the OECD (Katz 1994). Along with skill-biased technical
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change and higher educational levels, labor markets have been subject to increasing
mismatch between the skills of workers and the skills required by rms. In EU
countries that have experienced an intense upgrading of tertiary education within
the last fteen years, the supply of skilled workers has outstripped the supply of
skilled jobs. In these countries job competition, overeducation and crowding out
have been particularly relevant (Dolado et al. 2003).1
Skill mismatch and job competition are reected in wages and unemployment
rates across and within skill groups. However, as Murphy and Topel (1997) claim,
the unemployment rate has become less informative about the state of the labor
market. For example, in a study evaluating histories of unemployment and non-
employment among American men between 1967-1994, the unemployment rate in
1994, 4.7 percent, is only slightly higher than in 1974 or 1978-1979, whereas non-
participation more than doubled from the late 1960s to the 1990s (from 4 percent
to 8.1 percent of the potential labor supply in 1994). When considering di¤erences
across skill groups, they observe a declining trend in the returns to work and labor
market opportunities, especially among the low skilled workers. This is reected
both as higher unemployment and higher nonparticipation rates.
This paper studies skill biased technological change, skill investment and the al-
location of workers and rms to jobs of di¤erent productivities. Within a matching
model with two-sided heterogeneity, we study how rms allocate vacancy creation
between high and low productivity jobs, and how workers allocate between labor
market states. The novelty of this study is to introduce an endogenously determined
skill distribution of the workers by allowing the possibility for workers to invest in
skills when entering the labor market. This feature of the model is of relevance
at least for long run analysis of labor markets, as one expects workers educational
choices to respond to market incentives. From a policy perspective, to a¤ect allo-
cational mismatches of the labor market, the structure of the costs of skills is an
obvious variable that may be inuenced by policy. The model is then extended to
allow for a complete choice of labor market states, by introducing endogenous labor
market participation to the model. Thus, workers may choose whether to partici-
pate to the labor market or not, and when choosing participating the workers decide
on their skill level endogenously.
1Collecting results from various studies on the incidence of mismatch Hartog (2000) concludes
that the incidence of overeducation has increased while the incidence of undereducation has de-
creased for three countries for which observations are available (Netherlands 1960-1995, Spain
1985-1990 and Portugal 1982-1992). For some countries however, notably the United States and
Great Britain, the development of skill demand and supply has been somewhat di¤erent. In
particular the United States experienced a sharp slowdown in the growth of the supply of skills
occurred after the 1980s (Katz 1994).
52
We consider a matching model of two-sided heterogeneity with high and low
skilled workers and minimum skill requirements for high productivity jobs. As Al-
brecht and Vroman (2002) or Gautier (2002) we take this to mean that low skilled
workers are qualied for low productivity jobs only and high skilled workers are
qualied for both high and low productivity jobs. The high skilled, however, are
not more productive in the low productivity jobs than low skilled workers. This
implies that high-skilled workers have a more favorable position in the labor market,
as they are suitable for both high and low-skill jobs whereas low-skill workers are
suitable for low-skill jobs only. It also implies that the relevant pool of unemployed
workers to match with is larger for rms that post low skill vacancies than it is for
rms posting high skill vacancies. We extend the model of Albrecht and Vroman
(2002) by incorporating an endogenously determined skill distribution. Upon entry
to the labor market workers may pay a one time education cost to become high
skilled instead of remaining low skilled. For workers to invest in skills, the improve-
ment in labor market prospects must compensate the cost of acquiring skills. The
payo¤ of upgrading depends on the relative productivities of job types and the job
competition that the worker faces in the job market from other workers.
Skill biased technological change is characterized by an increase in the produc-
tivity of high skill jobs relative to low skill jobs. The driving force of the model is
the way skill biased technological change a¤ects the expected values of high and low
skill jobs, and how the skill cost features in these values. First, output in high skill
jobs increases but also the outside option of high skill workers increases. The latter
e¤ect moderates the increase in the value of high skill jobs. For low skill rms, the
cost of cross-skilled high skill workers increases with an increase in their outside
option, but there is no increase in output. Thus, for low skill rms there is only
a negative e¤ect. In a standard setup, the expected value of high skill vacancies
increases relative to low skill vacancies and the fraction of low skill vacancies tends
to fall. In the present model, skill biased technological change increases the cost
of acquiring skills and alters the value of the outside option of high skill workers.
Workers must also consider the change in the degree of job competition that arises
from changes in the distributions of both vacancies and workers.
We show that the skill cost wrt. the obtained skill level plays a key role in
determining the labor market outcomes of the model. Because workers appropriate
surplus from the rms to compensate for the skill investment, a key feature of
the model is how large a share of match surplus the workers will appropriate and
which type of rms are hit harder by appropriation. Typically, the higher is the
marginal cost of skills, the more the value of high skill vacancies increases relative
to low skill vacancies. Additionally, the general equilibrium e¤ects through changes
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in the distributions of worker and rm types will interact with this e¤ect. We
study the e¤ect of skill biased technological change on job and worker distributions
with alternative assumptions on the skill costs. While unemployment increases in
most scenarios, the e¤ect on the distribution high and low skill vacancies, high and
low skilled workers, both among the total population and the unemployed, vary
according to the structure of skill costs.
When the marginal cost of acquiring higher skills is relatively high, the model
produces an expected result. Skill biased technological change increases rmsin-
centives to create high skill vacancies relative to low skill vacancies, because of
higher productivity in high skill jobs and because the appropriation of surplus by
workers alters the values of job types in favor of high skill jobs. Consequently the
share of low skill unemployed increases. Although the increase in the skill cost is
relatively high, it is compensated for in the unemployment value by the enhanced
labor market prospects for high skill workers. Consequently more workers acquire
skills and the fraction of high skill workers in the population increases. When the
marginal cost of skills wrt. the attained skill level falls, the shift towards high skill
vacancies becomes smaller. We show that the share of high skill vacancies may
actually fall, leading also to a fall in the share of high skilled workers. Despite a
smaller skill cost, workers do not have incentives to invest in skills anymore, because
labor market prospects for high skill workers are not promising enough. The share
of high skill workers in the population falls and low skill unemployment increases.
Although total output increases, unemployment tends to rise in all cases.
We then extend the model further to investigate how job competition and skill
biased technological change inuence labor market outcomes when also the labor
market participation margin is endogenous. Considering unemployment and non-
participation together is essential as they reect two sides of the same phenomenon.
Participation and labor market heterogeneity have been studied in the literature
(e.g. Sattinger 1995, Pissarides 2000) by considering heterogeneous preferences of
leisure or values of non-market time (determined by e.g. wealth). In line with
several earlier studies (e.g. McKenna 1987, Sattinger 1995) we assume that labor
market participation depends positively on the value of being unemployed.2 As
Sattinger (1995) points out this leads to an important di¤erence with search models
2More recently Garibaldi and Wasmer (2003, 2005) study the importance of frictions in a model
of endogenous participation. These studies feature an irreversible entry cost to participating to
the labor market. They show that decisions to participate and stop participating di¤er, and that
labor supply is determined by two margins: exit and entry. These margins coincide when the
irreversible sunk cost vanishes. See also Pries and Rogerson(2004) for a dynamic model with
participation costs.
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with a xed labor force: a higher unemployment rate is consistent with higher a
higher employment rate. Or vice versa lower employment is consistent with a lower
unemployment rate, so that joblessness is absorbed to the pool of nonparticipants.
The novelty of this study is to consider participation in a matching model where the
markets of heterogenous workers and rms interact. In addition to participation
e¤ects, the participation margin also interacts with job competition and crowding
out.
The extended model with endogenous labor market participation supports the
claim of Murphy and Topel (1997) that the unemployment rate has become less
informative of the aggregate state of the labor market. While skill biased techno-
logical change has modest e¤ects on unemployment in the model, the participation
margin uctuates much more. In most cases labor market participation decreases
with skill biased technological change. We conclude that the unemployment rate
gives a misleading picture of the employment e¤ects of skill biased technological
change.
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 constructs a matching
model with two-sided heterogeneity with an endogenously determined skill distrib-
ution of workers. In section 3 we derive and characterize the steady state equilibrium
of the model. Section 4 analyses the e¤ect of skill biased technological change on the
labor market variables. In section 5 we extend the model to incorporate endogenous
labor market participation. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
We consider a continuous time matching model with two types of workers and two
types of rms in the spirit of Albrecht and Vroman (2002).
Population and skillsIn the basic model the labor force (participants) L equals
the working age population P and is normalized to one. Workers can then be either
unemployed u or employed 1  u. Workers endogenously decide whether or not to
invest in the higher of two possible skill levels at a cost K (~s) : The skill investment
cost depends on the di¤erence between the two skill levels ~s = s2   s1 and those
who do not invest in skills remain at the lower level s1: We denote the fraction of
workers with skills s1 with p and the fraction of workers with skills s2 with 1  p.
Skill requirements and job productivityFirmsjobs are either lled or vacant.
Firms can post vacancies with di¤erent productivity requirements for the worker.
We assume that high skill workers are suitable for both high skilled jobs and low
skilled jobs, but low skilled workers are suitable only for low skill jobs. We assume
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that even though high skilled workers may work in a low skilled job, they are not
more productive than low skilled workers in these jobs. Throughout the study
we will assume that the parameter values of the model are such that high skill
workers are willing to accept low skilled jobs instead of waiting for a high skill job
to come along. We call this type of equilibrium a cross-skill matching equilibrium
following previous studies.3 Denote by s the skill level of a worker and y is the skill
requirement of the rm. The productivity of the job is then
x (s; y) =
(
y if s  y
0 if s < y
This way of modeling skills and productivity has the idea of a minimum skill re-
quirement for jobs. The rm pays the worker a wage w (s; y) which depends both on
the job type and the workers skills and is negotiated by Nash bargaining. The wage
will be discussed in more detail below. Jobs break up at an exogenous destruction
rate : Firms that post vacancies pay a (ow) vacancy cost c during search. The
cost is equal to all rms.
SearchWe assume that search is undirected.4 The matching rate is governed
by a matching function m (u; v) which has constant returns to scale and the usual
properties.5 The hazard for an unemployed worker to meet a vacant job is m(u;v)
u
=
q () ; where  = v
u
characterizes labor market tightness. The hazard for a vacant
rm to meet an unemployed worker is m(u;v)
v
= q () : The rate q () is increasing
and q () is decreasing in labor market tightness : The matching function is the
same for all types, so the hazards do not depend on type. The fraction of low skill
vacancies is  and the fraction of high skilled vacancies is 1 : Low skilled workers
do not qualify for high skill jobs so the e¤ective probability to meet a relevant
vacancy for low skilled workers is q () : The fraction of low skilled unemployed
workers is  and that of high skilled unemployed workers is 1   : Low skill rms
accept all workers but high skill rms accept only high skill workers. High skill
rms have thus the e¤ective probability (1  ) q () of meeting a suitable worker.
The equilibrium solves for ve endogenous variables: labor market tightness
; the fraction p of low skilled workers in the population, the share of low skilled
workers among the unemployed ; the share of low skilled vacancies  and the
equilibrium unemployment rate u. In equilibrium the surplus for all matched agents
3Eg. Albrecht and Vroman (2002) and Dolado et al. (2002).
4Directed search has received considerable attention in recent research, but we abstract from
these issues in this study.
5The matching function is increasing and concave in both of its arguments with m (0; v) =
m (u; 0) = 0:
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must be positive and there is free entry for rms in both markets. In steady state
the ows into and out of unemployment must be equal. Accordingly we have a free
entry condition and a steady state labor market ow condition for each market.
Also it must be that ; ; u; p 2 [0; 1] and  > 0:
2.1 Match surplus and value equations
Matches between vacant rms and unemployed workers are formed whenever the
surplus of the match is nonnegative. We denote the value of unemployment for a
worker of skills s is U (s) and the value for a rm of holding a vacant job with skill
requirement y is V (y) ; the value of being employed in a job with skill requirement y
for a worker with skills s isW (s; y) and the value of a lled job with skill requirement
y and a worker with skills s is J (s; y) :Amatch between a rmwith skill requirement
y and a worker of skills s produces a surplus of S (s; y) and for the match to be
formed it must be that
S (s; y) = J (s; y) +W (s; y)  V (y)  U (s)  0: (1)
2.1.1 Firms
The ow value of a lled job with skill requirement y and a worker of skills s is
rJ (s; y) = y   w (s; y)   [J (s; y)  V (y)] : (2)
The ow value equals the productivity y of the match minus the wage w (s; y) paid
to the worker and the loss of the rms surplus in case of exogenous job destruction
which takes place at rate .
The value equations for low and high skill vacancies are
rV (s1) =  c+ q () f [J (s1; s1)  V (s1)] (3)
+(1  )max [J (s2; s1)  V (s1) ; 0]g
rV (s2) =  c+ q () (1  ) [J (s2; s2)  V (s2)] (4)
The ow value equals the search cost c plus the payo¤of matching. The low skill rm
has the probability q ()  of matching with a low skill worker and the probability
q () (1  ) of matching with a high skilled worker. The last term in the value
equation for a low skill vacancy takes account of the requirement that a cross-skill
match must yield positive surplus, J (s2; s1)   V (s1)  0: The value equation for
the high skill vacancy takes account of only the high skill workers being suitable
for high skill jobs. The high skill rm meets a high skill worker with probability
q () (1  ) :
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Firms enter into both markets until the value of posting a vacancy goes to zero
V (si) = 0. Substituting these into the asset value equations for vacancies in each
market gives the job creation conditions for both vacancy types
J (s1; s1) + (1  ) J (s2; s1) = c
q ()
(5)
(1  ) J (s2; s2) = c
q ()
(6)
These conditions state that the expected surplus for the rm of each job type equals
the expected job creation cost.
2.1.2 Workers
The ow value for an employed worker of skills s in a job with skill requirement y
is
rW (s; y) = w (s; y)   [W (s; y)  U (s)] ; (7)
and has an analogous interpretation to the value equation for a lled job. The worker
receives a wage w (s; y) and faces the risk of loss of surplus at the destruction rate
:
The ow values for low and high skilled unemployed workers are given by sepa-
rate value equations.
rU (s1) = b+ q () [W (s1; s1)  U (s1)] (8)
rU (s2) = b+ q () fmax [W (s2; s1)  U (s2) ; 0]
+ (1  ) [W (s2; s2)  U (s2)]g (9)
For low skilled unemployed workers the ow value of unemployment equals an
unemployment benet b plus the expected payo¤ of search. For the low skilled
worker the probability of being matched is q () as only low skill jobs can be
accepted. For the high skilled worker the probability of being matched is q () :
For the high skilled workers, the payo¤ depends on the shares of each type of
vacancies in the market. With probability  a low skill vacancy is met and with
probability (1  ) a high skill vacancy is met. Cross skill matching requires that
the surplus must be positive for the match to be formed, W (s2; s1)  U (s2)  0:
Initially all workers are endowed with skills s1: Before entering the labor market
workers may upgrade there skills from s1 to s2 by incurring a lump sum education
cost K (~s) : The education cost depends on the productivity di¤erence between the
two job types ~s = s2  s1; and K (~s) > 0 and K 0 (~s)  0: The education cost is paid
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upon entry to the labor market, after which the skill type of the worker does not
change.6
The form of the education cost function is specied as
K (~s) =


(s2   s1) (10)
where  > 0 and  > 0: The cost for a worker of skills s1 of acquiring the higher
skill level s2 may depend on a variety of features. One can think of various plausible
scenarios:
Convex cost functionWe rst assume increasing marginal cost of skills s.t.
 > 1: In this case acquiring higher skills becomes more costly with as s2 increases.
This standard cost function has the interpretation that learning new skills becomes
harder as more e¤ort is needed to acquire the higher skill level.
Linear cost functionWe then assume that  = 1 s.t. the cost function is
linear in the productivity di¤erence. The costliness of acquiring higher skills is
proportional to the skill di¤erence between the two skill levels.
Concave cost functionIn this case 0 <  < 1 so that the marginal cost of skills
is decreasing. Here learning may be considered to have economies of scale. For
example, learning new to use new software may initially be relatively hard, but the
more programmes a person has learned, the easier it becomes to learn new ones.
This is a typical case of learning by doing.
The distribution of worker types is determined by the di¤erence in the unem-
ployment values for each skill type and the lump sum education cost
U (s2)  U (s1) = K (~s) : (11)
This condition equates the gain in unemployment values to the education cost.7
2.2 Wages
Match surplus is divided between the rm and the worker by the Nash bargaining
solution. The rst order condition is
 [J (s; y)  V (y)] = (1  ) [W (s; y)  U (s)] (12)
6This assumption is made to avoid complcations related to the ows between skill types.
7In this setup we do not consider education as time consuming (see e.g. Becker (2005)), as this
would require the introduction of an additional labor market state to the model. Implicitly we
assume that the time required to obtain higher skills is consumed before entering search in the
labor market.
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where 0    1 is the bargaining power of the worker. In equilibrium V (y) = 0
and by substituting from the value equations we obtain
w (s; y) = y + (1  ) rU (s) : (13)
The wage consists of two components. The rst part y is determined by match
productivity y of which the worker gets a share according to the bargaining para-
meter : The second part is determined by the workers outside option i.e. the value
of unemployment for the worker. There are three possible wages
w (s1; s1) = s1 + (1  ) rU (s1)
w (s2; s1) = s1 + (1  ) rU (s2)
w (s2; s2) = s2 + (1  ) rU (s2)
The wage for a low skilled worker is w (s1; s1). It depends on the match productivity
s1 and on the value of unemployment for a low skilled worker rU (s1) : The low
skilled worker would be equally productive in any other potential job so the value
of unemployment depends on s1:
For a high skilled worker there are two possible wages. If the high skilled worker
is in a low skilled job, her productivity equals that of a low skilled worker. However,
the outside option of a high skilled worker is higher and therefore the wage depends
on rU (s2) : The high skilled worker has potential high productivity jobs included in
the outside option. In a high skilled job the high skilled worker has a higher wage
than in a low skill job because the workers productivity is higher.
3 Equilibrium
The model produces two di¤erent types of equilibria, depending on the parameter
values of the model. In cross skill matching equilibriumhigh skill workers accept
both high and low skill jobs. In ex post segmentation equilibriumhigh skill workers
do not nd it benecial to accept low skill vacancies and therefore there are no
mismatched workers (i.e. high skill workers in low skill jobs). We will limit the
analysis to a parameter range such that high skill workers accept both types of
jobs so that we have an equilibrium with cross skill matching. This requires that
s1  rU (s2) : Generally, a su¢ ciently high share of low skilled workers p or a
su¢ ciently small spread between di¤erent productivity types produces this case.
The conditions for cross skill matching are presented below.
The equilibrium is solved by deriving the equilibrium values for ve endogenous
variables: labor market tightness ; the fraction p of low skilled workers in the
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population,the share of low skilled workers among the unemployed ; the share of
low skilled vacancies  and the equilibrium unemployment rate. In equilibrium
the surplus for all matched agents must be positive and there is free entry for
rms in both markets. The latter implies that V (si) = 0 in both markets. With
the free-entry conditions we determine labor market tightness  (reecting total
vacancy creation) and the allocation  of vacancies between job types from the
rmsoptimizing behavior. In addition there is a steady-state labor market ow
condition for each market from which we obtain the equilibrium unemployment rate
and the fractions of worker types in the labor force. Additionally we require that
; ; u; p 2 [0; 1] and  > 0:
3.1 Steady-state ows
In steady state the ow out of and into unemployment must be equal for both
worker types. For low skilled workers the steady state condition is
q () u =  (p  u) : (14)
The probability of meeting a low skilled vacancy for the worker is q () and u
is the measure of low skilled unemployed workers. The ow out of unemployment
for low skilled workers is thus given by q () u: The ow into unemployment is
given by  (p  u) where  is the rate of exogenous job destruction. p is the share
of low skilled workers in the workforce and p  u is thus the measure of employed
low skilled workers.
An analogous condition for the high skilled workers is
q () (1  )u =  [1  p  (1  )u] : (15)
As high skilled workers are suitable for all jobs and given our assumptions they
will also accept all jobs, the probability of meeting an acceptable vacancy is simply
q () : With (1  )u being the measure of unemployed high skilled workers the
outow of unemployment is given by q () (1  )u: The inow to unemployment
 [1  p  (1  )u] is the destruction rate multiplied by the share of employed high
skilled workers.
The two steady-state conditions can be solved for the share of low skill workers
in the population p and the equilibrium unemployment rate u respectively, which
produce
p =
 [ + q ()]
 + q () [1   (1  )] (16)
and
u =
 (1  p)
(1  ) [ + q ()] : (17)
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We see that p is a function of ;  and  and the parameter  and that u is a function
of ;  and the parameter . The share of low skilled workers p in the population is
decreasing in the variable  and increasing in the variables  and : The equilibrium
unemployment rate is decreasing in  and p and increasing in :
3.2 Job creation
The total amount of vacancies and their allocation across markets are determined
by the free-entry conditions given above. Substituting from the value equations for
J (s; y) and the wage equation the job creation conditions yield
 [s1   rU (s1)] + (1  ) [s1   rU (s2)] = (r + ) c
(1  ) q () (18)
(1  ) [s2   rU (s2)] = (r + ) c
(1  ) q () (19)
where the ow values of unemployment rU (s1) and rU (s2) are8
rU (s1) =
(r + ) b+ q ()s1
r +  + q ()
(20)
rU (s2) =
(r + ) b+ q () [s1 + (1  ) s2]
r +  + q ()
: (21)
Instead of working with the above job creation conditions (18) and (19), we
follow Albrecht and Vroman (2002) and derive two alternative conditions to simplify
later analysis. Free entry for rms implies that the value of posting a vacancy in
either market must be equal and vacancies enter until zero prots prevail in both
markets. Therefore V (s1) = V (s2) = 0: Subtracting (18) from (19) produces an
equal valuecondition for the allocation of vacancies
(1  ) (s2   s1) =  [s1   rU (s1)] : (22)
Substituting rU (s1) into the equation gives the form
(1  ) (s2   s1) =  (r + ) (s1   b)
r +  + q ()
: (23)
Substituting the equal value condition (23) into (19) we obtain the second job
creation condition
s1   b = [r +  + q ()] c
(1  ) q () : (24)
This condition determines labor market tightness  which characterizes total va-
cancy creation. Conditions (23) and (24) can be used instead of (18) and (19) in
determining the equilibrium of the model.
8See appendix for derivations.
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3.3 Skill choice condition
To obtain the nal equilibrium equation, we rewrite the workers equal valuecon-
dition (11) as
rU (s2)  rU (s1) = rK (~s) : (25)
This may be interpreted as a ow version of the workers equal valuecondition.
Substituting the expressions (20) and (21) into this equation we obtain
(r + ) b+ q () [s1 + (1  ) s2]
r +  + q ()
  (r + ) b+ q ()s1
r +  + q ()
= rK (~s) (26)
which is a function of labor market tightness , the share of high skill vacancies 
and parameters. As it is assumed that K 0 (~s)  0, both sides of the equation are
increasing in the skill level s2: The distribution of vacancy types plays an important
role in determining the payo¤ of skill upgrading. The higher is the share 1    of
high skill vacancies, the better are the labor market prospects for high skill workers.
A key feature in the workers decision to acquire skills is the possibility for high
skill workers to extract surplus from rms. A high skilled worker benets from the
fact that high skill rms cannot employ low skill workers. This implies that workers
can appropriate surplus from rms to compensate for the skill investment. But
low skill rms must also pay high skill workers according to their outside option
as they recognize that otherwise these workers will choose to search for a high
skilled job. Thus high skill workers wages are a¤ected in both job types. The
higher unemployment value rU (s2) for high skilled workers will be a key element
in determining the rms incentives to allocate vacancies between the two job types.
In general equilibrium  and  will adjust to balance changes of s2 in equation (26).
3.4 Equilibrium conditions
For easier reference we collect the equilibrium equations for the ve endogenous
variables u; p; ;  and . The skill upgrading condition (26) of workers has been
replaced by an alternative expression which is more convenient in the analysis that
will follow.9
 Equilibrium unemployment rate
u =
 (1  p)
(1  ) [ + q ()] (27)
9See appendix for derivation.
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 Fraction of low skilled in the population
p =
 [ + q ()]
 + q () [1   (1  )] (28)
 Skill upgrading condition
1

(s2   s1)  (r + ) (s1   b)
(1  ) [r +  + q ()] = rK (~s) (29)
 Equal value condition
(1  ) (s2   s1) =  (r + ) (s1   b)
r +  + q ()
(30)
 Total vacancy creation, labor market tightness 
s1   b = [r +  + q ()] c
(1  ) q () (31)
The model can be solved recursively. Due to the properties of the matching
function, equation (31) gives a unique solution for : Equation (29) is monotonously
increasing in (; )  space so when there is a cross skill matching equilibrium, equa-
tions (31) and (29) produce a unique solution for the pair (; ) : With knowledge
of  and  equation (30) solves : Finally, equations (27) and (28) solve for u and
p after substituting ;  and :
3.5 Parameter restrictions for cross-skill matching
As discussed previously cross skill equilibrium requires that s1  rU (s2) : Generally,
a su¢ ciently high share of low skilled workers p or a su¢ ciently small di¤erence
between the two productivity types s2   s1produces this case. Reformulating the
requirement for cross-skill matching gives
(r + ) (s1   b)  q () (1  ) (s2   s1) (32)
In the case of cross-skill matching there is also the possibility of a corner solution
in which rms post only low skill vacancies, so that  = 1. The corner solution
occurs when the value of posting a low skill vacancy is positive at  = 1. We
can show however, that the present model rules out this possibility. A su¢ cient
condition to rule out the corner solution is
(1  p) (s2   s1) > p(r + ) (s1   b)
r +  + q ()
(33)
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It is easy to show that when there is cross-skill matching,  > p.10 Consequently,
whenever K > 0 and the education investment condition holds it is the case that
(33) is valid.
4 Skill-biased technological change
We now proceed to analyze the e¤ects of skill biased technological change on the
labor market variables. Skill-biased technological change is characterized by an
increase in the spread between the productivities of high and low skilled jobs, so
that s2 increases while keeping s1 xed.
The driving force of the model is the way skill biased technological change a¤ects
the expected values of high and low skill jobs, and how the skill cost features in
these values. First, when s2 increases for given values of the endogenous variables,
output in high skill jobs increases but also the outside option of high skill workers
increases. The latter e¤ect moderates the output e¤ect and the incentives to shift
vacancy allocation to high skill jobs. For low skill rms, the cost of cross-skilled
high skill workers increases with an increase in their outside option, but there is no
increase in output. Thus, for low skill rms there is only a negative e¤ect. Ceteris
paribus, vacancies would typically be allocated towards high skill jobs. Second,
recall from (25) that rU (s2) = rU (s1) + rK (~s) : A rise in s2 implies a rise in the
skill cost, and for (25) to be restored the value of unemployment for a high skill
worker must rise, the more so the larger the rise in the skill cost. By substituting
(25) for rU (s2) into (18) and (19) one may see the e¤ect of the skill cost on job
creation. The higher the marginal cost of skills, the smaller is the increase in surplus
induced by a rise in s2 for high skill jobs, and the larger is the negative e¤ect on low
skill surplus, ceteris paribus. Thus the marginal cost of skills is of key importance
in a¤ecting the relative values of the two job types. Typically, a higher marginal
cost alters job values in favor of high skill jobs. Additionally, the e¤ects through
the endogenous variables also a¤ect the changes in the relative values of the job
types.
We rst derive the general conditions for the comparative statics and then dis-
cuss alternative cases for the skill cost function, illustrating them by numerical
examples. We set standard values for the parameters of the model. The matching
10This follows from the requirement that 1  p is a fraction i.e.
1  p = (1  ) [ + q ()]
 + q () [1   (1  )]
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function is assumed to take the Cobb-Douglas specication m (u; v) = uv1  and
the workers matching elasticity parameter is set to  = 0:4. The job destruction
rate is  = 0:1: These values are consistent with the empirical literature. We use the
standard assumptions that rms and workers receive an equal share of the match
surplus s.t.  = 0:5 and the ow job creation cost is set at c = 0:3: The unemploy-
ment compensation is b = 0:2: and the interest rate is r = 0:05: Productivity in low
skill jobs is s1 = 1 and productivity in high skill jobs s2 = 1:2 in the initial cross-skill
matching equilibrium. The cost function for skills has the formK (~s) = 

(s2   s1)
and we set the value of  so that in the initial state the fraction of low skilled work-
ers is p = 2=3 as in Albrecht and Vroman (2002). This parametrization produces
an equilibrium where u = 0:063; p = 0:667;  = 0:695;  = 0:868 and  = 2:252:
Table 1 presents the numerical examples.
4.1 Equilibrium comparative statics (; ; ; p; u)
From equation (31) it is immediate that labor market tightness is not a¤ected by
the increase in s2 so we have
d
ds2
= 0
regardless of the functional form of the education cost function.
As labor market tightness is una¤ected by skill biased technological change, the
key block of equations are (29) and (30) ; which determine the workers incentives to
acquire higher skills or remain low skilled and the rms incentives to allocate vacan-
cies between the two types. Di¤erentiating the equations produces the comparative
statics for the share of unemployed workers  and low skill vacancies 
d
ds2
=
 (1  )
h
1

(s2   s1)  rK (~s)
i
(s2   s1)
h
1

(s2   s1)  rK (~s)
i (34)
d
ds2
=
rK (~s) (   )h
1

(s2   s1)  rK (~s)
i
q()(s2 s1)
r++q()
(35)
where  = K
0(~s)~s
K(~s)
is the elasticity of the education cost wrt. to the productivity
di¤erential ~s = s2   s1:11 Note that the denominator is positive in both equations.
It is immediate to see that the form of the skill cost function will play a central role
for the comparative statics of  and :
To determine d
ds2
; use  = 1 in the numerator of (34) and substitute for rK (~s)
11See appendix for detailed derivations.
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from (29) to produce
sign

d
ds2

= sign

(r + ) (s1   b)
(1  ) [r +  + q ()]

> 0:
From this it follows that d
ds2
> 0 when the cost function is concave, i.e. when  < 1.
As  increases the e¤ect becomes smaller and turns negative at a threshold level.
The threshold level can be expressed as12
sign

d
ds2

= sign
"
1

(s2   s1)
rK (~s)
  
#
: (36)
Because  is a fraction it is immediate from (35) that for convex and linear cost
functions d
ds2
< 0: At the threshold  =  the e¤ect on  turns positive.
Ultimately the comparative statics of  and  determine the outcomes of the
remaining variables. As  is una¤ected by s2; the e¤ect of skill biased technological
change on p and u are given by
sign

dp
ds2

= sign

1
(1  ) 
d
ds2
+
q ()
 + q ()
d
ds2

(37)
sign

du
ds2

= sign

(1  ) d
ds2
   d
ds2

: (38)
With the general conditions for the comparative statics we now proceed to examine
the e¤ect of skill biased technological change in the various cases of the skill cost
function.
4.2 Skill biased technological change and the structure of
skill costs
We begin with a convex skill cost function ( = 4 in Table 1) as it provides perhaps
the most intuitive results. An increase in s2 raises productivity in high skill jobs.
The outside option of high skilled workers increases as well, moderating the positive
e¤ect on the surplus of high skill jobs and reducing expected surplus of low skilled
jobs. Vacancy creation changes towards high skill jobs (@=@s2 < 0) because the
relative values of job types change in favor of high skill jobs. A relatively high
marginal cost of skills (and thus in the unemployment value U (s2)) moderates the
incentives for workers to invest in skills, but because of the improvement in the
prospects for high skilled workers more workers invest in skills (@p=@s2 < 0) : Low
skilled unemployment increases (@=@s2 > 0) somewhat due to the reduction in the
12See appendix.
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share of low skill jobs. Total output increases, despite an increase in unemployment.
These results are qualitatively similar to those in earlier studies.13
When the convexity of the cost function decreases ( = 2 to  = 0:9 in Table
1), skill biased technological change has a smaller e¤ect on the marginal cost of
skills. The relative values of the job types are still altered in favor of high skill jobs
and the share of high skill jobs does increase (@=@s2 < 0) ; but less than above.
Even though the increase in the skill cost is lower than above, less workers invest
in skills (@p=@s2 > 0). This is because the labor market prospects for high skilled
workers are not improved enough. The share of low skilled unemployed increases
(@=@s2 > 0) more than above, because now there are more low skilled workers
in the labor force in addition to the smaller increase in the share of high skilled
vacancies. Unemployment and output increase.
Reducing further the slope of the cost curve ( = 0:5 to  = 0:1 in Table 1), the
e¤ect of skill biased technological change on the marginal cost of skills decreases
further. Despite this, the share of low skilled workers increases (@p=@s2 > 0) ; be-
cause the relative values of the two job types changes in favor of low skilled jobs.
Vacancy creation is altered towards low skill jobs (@=@s2 < 0) and the labor mar-
ket prospects for low skilled workers are improved. However, despite the increase
in the fraction of low skill jobs, low skill unemployment increases due to the higher
share of low skilled workers in the labor force.
The e¤ects on the skill distribution of the labor force and among the unemployed
as well as the allocation of vacancies depends on the marginal cost of skills. The
driving force behind these e¤ects is the e¤ect of the skill cost on the appropriability
of match surplus by workers. Although output increases in all scenarios, so does
unemployment. The e¤ect on the distribution high and low skill vacancies, high
and low skilled workers, both among the total population and the unemployed,
vary according to the structure of skill costs. The model does not give a complete
picture of the employment e¤ects of skill biased technological change however. This
is discussed in the following section: when the model is extended to incorporate
endogenous labor market participation, we show that the unemployment rate be-
comes less informative of the state of the labor market as the participation margin
absorbs employment e¤ects of skill biased technological change.
13Increasing the convexity of the cost function enough produces a range where  may decrease.
However, this area does not necessarily feature in the cross-skill equilibrium range.
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s2 S d p L u Y
Initialequilibrium
1. 20 2. 252 0. 868 0. 667 0. 695 0. 063 0. 999
Skillbiased technologicalchange:Highmarginalcost
J = 4 1. 25 2. 252 0. 733 0. 651 0. 713 0. 071 1. 012
Skillbiased technologicalchange:Mediummarginalcost
J = 2 1. 25 2. 252 0. 823 0. 695 0. 732 0. 066 1. 006
J = 1 1. 25 2. 252 0. 857 0. 710 0. 738 0. 064 1. 004
J = 0. 9 1. 25 2. 252 0. 860 0. 711 0. 739 0. 064 1. 004
Skillbiased technologicalchange: Lowmarginalcost
J = 0. 5 1. 25 2. 252 0. 871 0. 715 0. 741 0. 064 1. 003
J = 0. 1 1. 25 2. 252 0. 882 0. 720 0. 743 0. 063 1. 003
Table 1. The e¤ect of skill biased technological change on equilibium labor
market variables.
5 Endogenous labor market participation
To complete the analysis of workerslabor market choices we extend the model by
incorporating a third labor market status for workers, non-participation. Workers
who are without a job may choose either to search actively for a new job or they
may decide not to participate in search and thus remain outside the labor force.
Matching depends on the measure of open vacancies and the pool of actively search-
ing workers. We make a distinction between the workers without a job who actively
search for one and those who do not search and are considered as out of the labor
force. In this extended setup there are thus three labor market states for workers:
employed, unemployed who actively search and nonparticipants. We abstract from
the possibility of workers moving directly from out of the labor force to employ-
ment. As discussed in Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) transitions directly from
out of the labor force into employment may be considered as a result of inadequate
measurement. For example, in data with monthly or quarterly survey periods, an
inactive worker who starts search and nds a job within a week is considered as
moving from out of the labor force to employment. However, this worker was an
actively searching worker when nding a job although the search period was short.
Therefore, when the period of analysis is su¢ ciently short we can assume all hires
to come from the ranks of the unemployed.14
14Blanchard and Diamond (1989) consider various denitions of the relevant pool of searching
workers, but they nd that inactive workers do not enter the matching function with a signicant
69
5.1 Matching and skill distribution
We continue to assume that the size of the working age population normalized to
one. Now some workers opt for nonparticipation, so the working age population P =
1 and the labor force LP = L are no longer equal. Unemployment u now denotes
the fraction of unemployed workers as a fraction of the labor force L: Vacancies v
are also referred to as the number of vacant jobs as a fraction of the labor force.
We express the matching function as
mL = m (uL; vL) :
By the homogeneity of the matching function, the hazard rates for the rm and
worker are, respectively,
m (uL; vL)
vL
= m
u
v
; 1

= q ()
m (uL; vL)
uL
= m

1;
v
u

= q () :
The hazard rates are functions of the ratio of vacancies to unemployment (labor
market tightness)  = v
u
only. The e¤ective hazard rates with di¤erent types are also
unchanged. The fractions of low and high skill vacancies are  and (1  ) and the
hazards for a worker of meeting a low and high skill vacancy are, respectively q ()
and (1  ) q (). The fraction of unemployed low skilled unemployed workers is
 and that of high skilled unemployed workers is (1  ) : Here it is just to bear
in mind that these are fractions of uL; the share of unemployed of the labor force
which does not include the nonparticipants. High and low skill rms have thus
the e¤ective probability (1  ) q () and q () ; respectively, of meeting a suitable
worker.
Although the overall hazard rates are independent of the participation rate, the
fractions of di¤erent worker types among the nonemployed require caution. We will
show below that if any low skill workers participate, all nonparticipants will be low
skilled. Consequently the share of high and low skill workers will not be the same
in the total labor force and among the participants.
The workers enter the economy with exogenously given low skills and decide
on their labor market state at the moment of entry. They face three alternatives:
participate with the given low skill level, pay the education cost and participate
as high skilled, or choose nonparticipation. The low and high skilled shares of the
population are, respectively,
 = (1  L) + pL (39)
1   = (1  p)L: (40)
coe¢ cient.
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The share of low skill workers in the population is given by the fraction 1   L
of workers endogenously choosing nonparticipation (and consequently staying low
skilled) and the fraction p of the participants who endogenously decide to remain
low skilled. The share of high skilled of the population are the fraction (1  p) of
the participants L who acquire skills.
The equilibrium unemployment rate (of the labor force participants L) is given
by equation (27) as above and the nonemployment rate is given by
n = 1  L+ uL: (41)
The nonemployed consist of the nonparticipants 1  L and the share of the unem-
ployed in the labor force uL:
5.2 Value equations
We continue to assume free entry of rms, rms may post high or low skill vacancies
and cross skill matching takes place in the above described parameter range. The
rmsvalue equations are thus the same as above, (3) and (4) :
Next consider the asset value equations of the workers. As above, the low skilled
workers may be matched with a low skill job and the high skilled workers may be
matched either with a high skill job or the may be mismatched (matched with
a low skill job). The value equations for being employed obey (7) for skills s and
output (job type) y as in the basic setup. In addition workers without a job have the
possibility of choosing not to participate to the labor market and producing through
a home-production technology (or getting a social assistance payment) which is not
proportional to their skill level si:
The asset-value equations for the low-skilled and high skilled unemployed work-
ers are respectively
rU (s1) = max fb+ q () [W (s1; s1)  U (s1)] ; rNg (42)
rU (s2) = b+ q () f [W (s2; s1)  U (s2)] + (1  ) [W (s2; s2)  U (s2)]g (43)
The asset value equation for the low skilled unemployed workers involves the term
rN which is the ow value of non-participation. The low skill unemployed workers
maximize between participating to the labor market or leaving the labor force. The
rst alternative involves the value of being unemployed b plus the expected payo¤
of search whereas nonparticipation involves the ow value of home production rN .
Because rU (s2) > rU (s1) for all feasible parameter values, the participation choice
concerns only the low skilled workers.15 Those that choose participation face the
same skill investment choice as in the previous section, given by equation (26).
15We show in the appendix that rU (s2) > rU (s1) for all parameter values.
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5.3 Participation rule
In modeling the participation decision of workers we follow McKenna (1987), by
assuming that workers make the labor market participation decision when entering
the economy. We thus abstract from ows between participation and nonparticipa-
tion, as they complicate the analysis considerably in the current setup.
The opportunity cost of participation is forgone leisure or home production l; and
we assume that individuals di¤er according to their valuation of l. The valuation
of leisure is distributed according to F (l) which is assumed to be continuous and
stationary over time. There will be a reservation valuation l0 for participation and
a fraction F (l0) of workers have a value of leisure equal to or less than l0 and
participate to the market. The reservation rule for participation is given by
rN = l0 = rU (s1) (44)
so we have
l0 =
(r + ) b+ q ()s1
r +  + q ()
: (45)
The reservation value of leisure l0 is increasing in the labor market prospects for low
skill workers (recall that the participation decision is relevant only to the low skill
workers). Therefore l0 increases in everything that increases the value of unemploy-
ment for low skilled workers rU (s1) ; so l0 increases in labor market tightness ;
the share of low skill vacancies ; low skill productivity s1 and the unemployment
compensation b:
As P = 1; the labor force participation rate is given by
L = F (l0) = F

(r + ) b+ q ()s1
r +  + q ()

: (46)
5.4 Equilibrium with endogenous labor market participa-
tion
The equilibrium equations for the endogenous variables n; L; l0; u; ; p; ;  and 
are
 Nonemployment
n = 1  L+ uL (47)
 Labor force
L = F (l0) (48)
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 Participation rule
l0 =
(r + ) b+ q ()s1
r +  + q ()
(49)
 Equilibrium unemployment rate
u =
 (1  p)
(1  ) [ + q ()] (50)
 The share of low skilled workers in the population
 = 1  L (1  p) (51)
 Fraction of low skilled workers in the labor force
p =
 [ + q ()]
 + q () [1   (1  )] (52)
 Skill upgrading condition
1

(s2   s1)  (r + ) (s1   b)
(1  ) [r +  + q ()] = rK (s2) (53)
 Equal value condition
(1  ) (s2   s1) =  (r + ) (s1   b)
r +  + q ()
(54)
Total vacancy creation
s1   b = [r +  + q ()] c
(1  ) q () (55)
The solution is recursive as above. Equation (55) provides a unique solution for
, which can be substituted into (53) to obtain the solution for : Having  and 
equation (54) solves for :With knowledge of ;  and  we can solve p using (52) :
Using these equilibrium values we can solve (49) for l0, then (48) for L and nally
(51) for  and (47) for n:
5.5 Skill biased technological change
We now proceed to study the e¤ects of skill biased technological change when in
addition to an endogenous skill distribution the participation rate is endogenous.
The comparative statics of the variables discussed in the benchmark model u; p; ; 
and  are the same as discussed above. One should bear in mind two features of
the extended model. Now p represents the share of low skilled workers among the
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participants L; not the total population P . Also remember that  is the fraction of
low skilled of the unemployed that participate uL, not among all the nonemployed
n = 1 L (1  u) : In this section we thus focus on l0; L;  and n: The comparative
static e¤ects are summarized in table 2.
In the linear and convex skill cost cases (see  = 1 to  = 4 in Table 1), the
labor market prospects of low skill workers deteriorate with skill biased technolog-
ical change, leading to a decrease in the threshold participation level l0 and a fall
in the labor force participation rate L: Nonemployment n unambiguously increases
in these two cases, reecting the claim of Murphy and Topel (1997) that among
the low skilled, deteriorating labor market prospects are reected as both higher
unemployment and higher nonparticipation rates. In this case the equilibrium un-
employment rate understates the negative employment e¤ect that takes place. In
the ranges where the marginal cost of skills is not extremely high, the fraction of low
skilled in the total working age population increases, as both the nonparticipation
and the share of low skilled of the labor force participants increases.16
The threshold participation level l0 increases with skill biased technological
change when the marginal cost of skills is su¢ ciently low (see  = 0:5;  = 0:1
in Table 1). This is because more vacancy creation is allocated to low skill jobs,
as discussed above. The reservation value of leisure l0 is increasing in the labor
market prospects for low skill workers, so more low skill vacancies raises l0 and
consequently the fraction of workers who participate in the labor force L increases.
Nonparticipation falls.
The extended model with endogenous labor market participation supports the
claim of Murphy and Topel (1997) that the unemployment rate is less indicative
of the aggregate state of the labor market. Changes in the economic environment
that a¤ect equilibrium unemployment and the allocation of unemployment between
high and low skilled labor also a¤ect the labor market at the participation margin.
In the range where the marginal cost of skills is high, the participation rate
falls simultaneously with the rise in the unemployment rate. The participation
margin thus amplies the negative employment e¤ect, so the unemployment rate
understates the e¤ect on employment. On the other hand, when the marginal cost
of skills is relatively low, the rise in the unemployment rate is accompanied by
an increase in the participation rate. In this case the unemployment rate gives a
qualitatively misleading picture of the employment e¤ect of skill biased technological
change. Summarizing, both the unemployment and participation rate should be
considered when evaluating employment e¤ects in the economy.
16When the marginal cost of skills is very high, the e¤ect on  turns negative, but this case may
not feature in the cross-skill matching range.
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s2 S d p L u l0 L e n
Initialequilibrium
1. 20 2. 252 0. 868 0. 667 0. 695 0. 063 0. 860 0. 720 0. 760 0. 326
Skillbiasedtechnologicalchange:Highmarginalcost
J = 4 1. 25 2. 252 0. 733 0. 651 0. 713 0. 071 0. 840 0. 679 0. 763 0. 369
Skillbiasedtechnologicalchange:Mediummarginalcost
J = 2 1. 25 2. 252 0. 823 0. 695 0. 732 0. 066 0. 854 0. 707 0. 784 0. 339
J = 1 1. 25 2. 252 0. 857 0. 710 0. 738 0. 064 0. 858 0. 717 0. 792 0. 329
J = 0. 9 1. 25 2. 252 0. 860 0. 711 0. 739 0. 064 0. 859 0. 718 0. 793 0. 328
Skillbiasedtechnologicalchange: Lowmarginalcost
J = 0. 5 1. 25 2. 252 0. 871 0. 715 0. 741 0. 064 0. 860 0. 721 0. 795 0. 325
J = 0. 1 1. 25 2. 252 0. 882 0. 720 0. 743 0. 063 0. 862 0. 723 0. 797 0. 322
Table 2. Skill biased technological change and endogenous participation.
6 Concluding remarks
The shift in demand towards more highly educated labor has been a widespread
phenomenon in OECD countries, but the labor market experiences wrt. the in-
cidence of unemployment between high and low skilled workers have varied. Job
competition and crowding out of low skilled workers by high skilled workers vary be-
tween countries. In addition to the unemployment consequences, participation rates
reect the consequences of skill biased technological change and job competition.
In this study, the costliness of acquiring additional skills plays a key role in de-
termining labor market outcomes in response to skill biased technological change.
The responses of workers to the shift in demand towards more educated labor de-
pend on the prospects of the labor market relative to the marginal cost of attaining
higher skills. In terms of policy, this could imply that by shaping the structure of
the costs of education, one may inuence labor market outcomes in desired ways.
When the model is extended to incorporate an endogenous labor market partic-
ipation margin, it supports the claim of Murphy and Topel (1997) that the unem-
ployment rate is less indicative of the aggregate state of the labor market. Changes
in the economic environment that a¤ect equilibrium unemployment and the allo-
cation of unemployment between high and low skilled labor also a¤ect the labor
market at the participation margin. The equilibrium unemployment rate does not
fully characterize the state of the labor market and therefore the focus should rater
be on employment and joblessness, the latter including both the unemployed and
nonparticipants. This applies also to policy measures intended to reduce unemploy-
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ment. Focusing solely on the unemployment rate may thus be misleading for policy
recommendations.
This study has been limited to study skill biased technological change in a model
of two sided heterogeneity with cross skill matching. An obvious extension would
be to consider ex post segmentation equilibria. Another perhaps interesting avenue
for future research would be to consider education as a time consuming activity, as
in eg. Becker (2005). This would incorporate an additional labor market state into
the model, but it could provide interesting aspects of education choice decisions of
workers.
A Appendix
A.1 Derivation of unemployment values
The ow value of unemployment for a low skilled worker is
rU (s1) = b+ q () [W (s1; s1)  U (s1)] :
Substitute W (s1; s1) =
w(s1;s1)+U(s1)
r+
and w (s1; s1) = s1 + (1  ) rU (s1) to get
rU (s1) = b+ q ()

s1 + (1  ) rU (s1) + U (s1)  (r + )U (s1)
r + 

cancel terms and rearrange to obtain
(r + ) rU (s1) = (r + ) b+ q () [s1   rU (s1)]
and thus
rU (s1) =
(r + ) b+ q ()s1
r +  + q ()
(56)
The ow value of unemployment for a high skilled worker is derived in an analogous
manner and produces
rU (s2) =
(r + ) b+ q () [s1 + (1  ) s2]
r +  + q ()
(57)
A.2 Derivation of equilibrium equations
In the derivation of the equilibrium equations we us an approach that is analogous to
Albrecht and Vroman (2002). Instead of using (18),(19) and (26), we use equivalent
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conditions V (s1) = V (s2), V (s2) = 0 and an alternative expression for (26). The
rst condition is derived by subtracting (18) from (19)
(1  ) (s2   s1) =  [s1   rU (s1)] (58)
and substituting (20) to get the equal valuecondition
(1  ) (s2   s1) =  (r + ) (s1   b)
r +  + q ()
: (59)
Multiply this expression by r++q () and add (1  ) (r + ) (s1   b) to both
sides to obtain
(1  ) [(r + ) (s2   b) + q () (s2   s1)] = (r + ) (s1   b) (60)
which will prove useful in what follows.
To derive the second equilibrium condition, substitute (21) into (19) to get
(1  ) (r + ) (s2   b) + q () (s2   s1)
r +  + q ()
=
(r + ) c
(1  ) q () : (61)
Substitute (60) to the left hand side, cancel and rearrange to obtain
s1   b = [r +  + q ()] c
(1  ) q () : (62)
Due to the properties of the matching function this equation produces a unique
solution for :
The third equilibrium condition is derived by adding and subtracting s2  s1 on
the left hand side (25)to get
s2   s1   [s2   rU (s2)] + [s1   rU (s1)] = rK (s2) : (63)
Use (58) to substitute the last left hand side term, substitute the numerator of the
second term using (60) and combine terms to obtain
1

(s2   s1)  (r + ) (s1   b)
(1  ) [r +  + q ()] = rK (s2) (64)
A.3 Skill biased technological change
A.3.1 Low skill unemployment
For the comparative static e¤ects of s2 recall from (31) that labor market tightness
is not a¤ected. To derive the comparative statics for  and  we use equation (30)
and (29). By the implicit function rule we obtain
d
ds2
=
1

  rK 0 (~s)
1
2
(s2   s1) + (r+)(s1 b)(1 )2[r++q()]
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and substitution of (29) into the denominator gives
d
ds2
=
(1  )
h
1

  rK 0 (~s)
i
1
2
(s2   s1)  rK (~s) : (65)
Multiply and divide by 1

(s2   s1) to get
d
ds2
=
 (1  )
h
1

(s2   s1)  rK (~s)
i
(s2   s1)
h
1

(s2   s1)  rK (~s)
i : (66)
As the denominator and  (1  ) is positive we have
sign

d
ds2

= sign

1

(s2   s1)  rK (~s)

(67)
Then substitute from (29) for rK (~s) to obtain
sign

d
ds2

= sign

(1  ) 1

(s2   s1) +  (r + ) (s1   b)
(1  ) [r +  + q ()]

: (68)
For the linear cost function  = 1 so
sign

d
ds2

= sign

(r + ) (s1   b)
(1  ) [r +  + q ()]

> 0: (69)
For the general case use (30) to substitute 1

(s2   s1) to get
sign

d
ds2

= sign

(1  ) (r + ) (s1   b)
(1  ) [r +  + q ()] + 
(r + ) (s1   b)
(1  ) [r +  + q ()]

:
(70)
A.3.2 Vacancy allocation
From (30) we obtain
d
ds2
=
h
s2   s1 + (r+)(s1 b)r++q()
i
d
ds2
  (1  )
 (r+)(s1 b)q()
[r++q()]2
:
From (30) we have
1  

(s2   s1) = (r + ) (s1   b)
r +  + q ()
so we obtain
d
ds2
=
1

(s2   s1) dds2   (1  )
(1  ) q()(s2 s1)
r++q()
: (71)
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Substitute (66) to get
d
ds2
=
(1  ) [
1

(s2 s1) rK(~s)]
[ 1 (s2 s1) rK(~s)]
  (1  )
(1  ) q()(s2 s1)
r++q()
: (72)
Cancel and rearrange terms to get
d
ds2
=
(   ) rK (~s)h
1

(s2   s1)  rK (~s)
i
q()(s2 s1)
r++q()
(73)
or
d
ds2
=
(   ) rK (~s)h
1

(s2   s1)  rK (~s)
i
1 

q()(s2 s1)2
(r+)(s1 b)
: (74)
A.3.3 Share of low skill workers
The share of low skill workers is given by
p =
 [ + q ()]
 + q () [1   (1  )] : (75)
As  is una¤ected by s2; the e¤ect of skill biased technological change is given by
dp
ds2
=
@p
@
d
ds2
+
@p
@
d
ds2
(76)
which produces
dp
ds2
=
[ + q ()] [ + q ()]
f + q () [1   (1  )]g2
d
ds2
+
 (1  ) q () [ + q ()]
f + q () [1   (1  )]g2
d
ds2
: (77)
This expression reduces to
sign

dp
ds2

= sign

1
 (1  )
d
ds2
+
q ()
 + q ()
d
ds2

(78)
or
sign

dp
ds2

= sign

p

d
ds2
+
 (1  ) q ()
 + q () [1   (1  )]
d
ds2

(79)
A.3.4 Equilibrium unemployment
To derive the e¤ects of skill biased technological change on u we rst use (28) to
derive
1  p = (1  ) [ + q ()]
 + q () [1   (1  )] (80)
which we substitute into (27) and cancel terms to obtain
u =

 + q () [1   (1  )] (81)
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which gives the equilibrium unemployment rate as a function of  and :
du
ds2
=
@u
@
d
ds2
+
@u
@
d
ds2
(82)
which reduces to
du
ds2
=
q ()
h
(1  ) d
ds2
   d
ds2
i
f + q () [1   (1  )]g2 (83)
du
ds2
= u
q ()
h
(1  ) d
ds2
   d
ds2
i
 + q () [1   (1  )] (84)
It is immediate that
sign

du
ds2

= sign

1

d
ds2
  1
1  
d
ds2

: (85)
A.4 Unemployment values: rU (s2) > rU (s1)
We can formally show that rU (s2) > rU (s1) for all parameter values of the model.
We have
rU (s2) > rU (s1)
(r + ) b+ q () [s1 + (1  ) s2]
r +  + q ()
>
(r + ) b+ q ()s1
r +  + q ()
Multiply both sides by r +  + q () and rearrange to get
(1  ) q () s2 > [(r + ) b+ q ()s1]

r +  + q ()
r +  + q ()
  1

or
(1  ) q () s2 > [(r + ) b+ q ()s1]

q () (1  )
r +  + q ()

Cancel (1  ) q () from both sides, multiply and divide the left hand side by
[r +  + q ()] and rearrange to get
(r + ) (s2   b) + q () (s2   s1)
r +  + q ()
> 0:
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Chapter 4
Labor Taxation, Equilibrium
Unemployment and Macroeconomic
Dynamics
Abstract
This paper studies the e¤ects of labor taxes and labor tax reform on
equilibrium labor market outcomes and macroeconomic dynamics in a New
Keynesian model with matching frictions. Three policy instruments are con-
sidered: a marginal tax rate and a tax subsidy to produce tax progression
schemes, and a replacement ratio to account for variability in outside op-
tions. In equilibrium, the marginal tax rate and replacement ratio dampen
economic activity whereas tax subsidies boost the economy. The marginal
tax rate and replacement ratio amplify shock responses whereas employment
subsidies weaken them. The tax instruments a¤ect the degree to which the
wage absorbs shocks. We show that the relative e¤ects of the tax instruments
and thus the e¤ects of tax progression are sensitive to the initial degree of
tax progression in the economy. Increasing tax progression when taxation is
initially progressive is harmful for steady state employment and output, and
amplies the sesitivity of macroeconomic variables to shocks. When taxation
is initially proportional, increasing progression is benecial for output and
employment and dampens shock responses of macroeconomic variables.
1 Introduction
The relatively poor performance of European labor markets is frequently blamed
on high and distorting labor taxes as well as generous unemployment compen-
sation schemes. Consequently, the restructuring of employment taxes and other
labor market institutions feature prominently on the European policy agenda. Ac-
cording to the European Commission Guidelines for Employment Policies of the
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Member States (2005) policies should: "Ensure employment-friendly labour cost
developments and wage-setting mechanisms by. . . reviewing the impact on employ-
ment of non-wage labour costs and where appropriate adjust their structure and
level" ... "Ensure that wage developments contribute to macroeconomic stability
and growth". Two concerns are immediate in the policy guidelines. First, wage
determination and non-wage labor costs are pointed out as key determinants of
equilibrium employment. Second, nominal wages and labour cost developments
should be consistent with price stability and the trend in productivity over the
medium term. Accordingly, labor market policies should reinforce the macroeco-
nomic framework by increasing exibility and adjustment capacity in response to
e.g. technological advances and cyclical changes. Although extensive academic re-
search e¤ort has been devoted to labor taxation and compensation schemes, policy
conclusions do not seem conclusive.
This paper investigates the role of income taxation and unemployment com-
pensation schemes in an economy from a dual perspective. First, we study the
equilibrium labor market e¤ects of the structure of taxes and subsidies. In par-
ticular we are interested of the e¤ects of changing the degree of tax progression
on equilibrium labor market variables and output. Second, we investigate whether
changes in tax structure and compensation schemes matter for the sensitivity of
the economy wrt. exogenous shocks. Because changes in taxation alter the steady
state of the economy, the new equilibrium levels and especially relative values of
the variables generate shock responses di¤erent to those in the initial equilibrium.
For the purpose of analyzing the cyclical behavior of a relatively large set of macro-
economic variables, we embed a search-matching model of the labor market à la
Mortensen-Pissarides (e.g. Pissarides 2000, Mortensen and Pissarides 1999a) into a
New Keynesian monetary model (e.g. Woodford 2003). This extension also allows
the study of e.g. interest rate shocks.1 The present model incorporates three la-
bor market policy instruments: a marginal income tax, a tax subsidy for employed
workers and a replacement ratio for unemployed workers. The marginal income
tax and employment subsidy jointly determine the degree of progression in income
taxation and the replacement ratio determines the income when unemployed.
The present study contributes to the all but conclusive theoretical literature on
tax structure and labor market outcomes. Koskela and Vilmunen show that under
plausible assumptions increased tax progression lowers wages and unemployment in
three trade union models of the labor market; the monopoly union, the right-to-
1In the literature the cyclical properties of the Mortensen-Pissarides type model is often lim-
ited to the analysis of productivity shocks, and may thereby miss important mechanisms of the
economy.
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manageand the e¢ cient bargain model. They conclude that the e¤ects of taxation
appear to be very sensitive to the structure of labor markets. Indeed, Pissarides
(1998) studies the e¤ects of employment tax cuts on unemployment and wages in
four di¤erent equilibrium models of the labor market: competitive, union bargain-
ing, search and e¢ ciency wages. He points out that there is no denitive model of
the European labor market and shows that e¤ects of changes in the structure and
level of taxation sometimes depends on the underlying model of the labor market.
He nds that when wages are determined by bargaining, a revenue neutral increase
in tax progression reduces unemployment in steady state. In a more general setting
with endogenous job destruction Sinko (2005) obtains qualitatively similar results.
Mortensen and Pissarides (2003) consider various tax and subsidy e¤ects on wages
and unemployment. They study policies that drive the labor market closer to e¢ -
ciencyin terms of search frictions but they do not explicitly address tax progression
schemes. Their calibrations show that the tightness to which the labor market is cal-
ibrated matters for the steady state outcomes. The interaction between shocks and
institutions in a matching model is studied in Mortensen and Pissarides (1999b), but
their focus is in unemployment compensation and employment protection policies.
In this paper we study labor tax reforms when taxation is initially proportional
and when it is initially progressive. Our analysis shows that when income taxation
is initially proportional as in Pissarides (1998) and Sinko (2005), a tax revenue
neutral increase in tax progression boosts employment and output as in these earlier
studies. But when income taxation is initially (su¢ ciently) progressive, the opposite
is true: further progression is detrimental for employment and output. This new
result contrasts the earlier ndings of Pissarides (1998) and Sinko (2005). When
implementing tax revenue neutral changes in tax progression, the relative weights
of changes in the dampening e¤ect of the marginal tax and the stimulating e¤ect
of the tax subsidy depend on the initial degree of tax progression. In an initialy
proportional tax system, the stimulating e¤ect of the tax subsidy dominates the
dampening e¤ect of the marginal tax. In an initially (su¢ ciently) progressive tax
system the opposite takes place.
We then proceed to comparing the dynamic behavior of pre and post tax reform
economies in a full scale macro model. A recent body of literature has explored the
role of real rigidities of the labor market in business cycle models by combining the
search-matching framework of the labor market to real business cycle models (Merz
1995, Andolfatto 1996, den Haan et al. 2000) and the New Keynesian monetary
model (Walsh 2003, 2005, Trigari 2004, Krause and Lubik 2005). These studies
have been successful in improving the performance of business cycle models in gen-
erating shock persistence in macroeconomic variables observed in the data. A key
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feature of these models is that they introduce employment adjustment in business
cycle models through changes in the number of employed workers (the extensive
margin) instead of in the number of hours (the intensive margin). This, combined
with search frictions of the labor market, generates involuntary unemployment and
sluggish employment adjustment into the business cycle models. The rigidity in the
adjustment of labor has proved to be of essence in generating persistence into the
business cycle models.
We show that taxes alter the rigidity of labor market adjustment and thus
changes in individual tax policy instruments produce well-dened e¤ects on the
dynamics of the economy. Higher marginal tax rates and replacement ratios amplify
shock responses both in terms of peak e¤ects and persistence whereas higher tax
subsidies dampen the impulse responses. These clear cut results abstract from any
tax revenue questions, so we proceed to study the e¤ects of tax revenue neutral
changes in tax progression with alternative assumptions on the initial tax scheme
of the economy. We show that the e¤ects of tax revenue neutral changes in tax
progression depend crucially on the initial degree of tax progression in the labor
market. When taxation is progressive in the initial state, the e¤ect of the marginal
tax on labor market variables dominates the tax subsidy e¤ect. This implies that
the dynamic responses to exogenous shocks are amplied by tax progression. When
taxation is initially proportional, increasing progression dampens shock responses
of macroeconomic variables. This is because the relative strengths of the two tax
e¤ects are reversed when the tax subsidy is su¢ ciently small. Thus we nd that a
government tax revenue neutral change in tax progression has opposite e¤ects on
the steady state and shock responses depending on the degree of tax progression in
the initial steady state.
A key issue in both the steady-state equilibrium analysis and the dynamic im-
pulse response analysis is the rigidity of the wage implied by the labor market policy
schemes wrt. to exogenous changes in the economy. Progressive taxation essentially
renders the wage less sensitive to exogenous shocks, thus shifting adjustments in the
labor market to other variables. This outcome relates to an active area of current
research. A critique of the Mortensen-Pissarides matching model that has been
strongly advocated by Shimer (2005) is that it does not produce su¢ cient uctu-
ations in vacancies and unemployment because the negotiated wage absorbs too
much of the shocks of an economy. This critique has led to an active debate in the
literature about the modeling of the wage in the matching model to achieve more
rigid wages (see e.g. Shimer 2005, Hall 2005, Mortensen and Nagypál 2005, Horn-
stein et al. 2005). The solution of Hall (2005) is a wage that is partly determined
by negotiation and partly by a wage norm. This solution has been adopted in a
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number of studies, but the wage norm still remains ad hoc. In business cycle models
wage rigidity has been incorporated along with matching frictions to the New Key-
nesian model in e.g. Krause and Lubik (2005). They demonstrate that the model
performance improves further, when wages respond less to shocks. Christo¤el and
Linzert (2005) and Christo¤el et al. (2005) come to similar conclusions. We show
that tax progression de facto makes the wage more rigid, producing a qualitatively
similar result to the wage norm solution. Our results are quantitatively less strong,
but no ad hoc assumptions on the foundations of wage rigidity are needed.
The structure of this study is as follows. In section 2 we construct a New
Keynesian model which incorporates matching frictions of the labor market and
the tax policy instruments. Section 3 characterizes and solves the steady state of
the model and presents the linearized system of equations. The model calibration
is discussed in section 4. In section 5 we rst analyze the e¤ects of labor market
policy on the steady state of the model at some length, as this reveals intuition and
the mechanisms that drive the dynamics of the model. Thereafter we consider the
dynamic responses to shocks for various tax policy regimes. Section 6 summarizes.
2 Model
The model economy follows the structure of Trigari (2004) and Walsh (2003, 2005)
by incorporating a Mortensen-Pissarides type of labor market with matching fric-
tions into a New Keynesian monetary model. The full-scale macro model allows
us to extend the dynamic analysis to a larger range of macroeconomic variables,
rather than labor market variables only. The two main driving forces of the models
dynamics are nominal rigidities in price setting and matching frictions. A charac-
teristic feature of the model is the separation of rms into two types, each type
taking account of one type of rigidity. This separation is made to separate the
nominal rigidities from the real rigidities, thus making the model more tractable.
The economy consists of the following:
HouseholdsHouseholds supply labor, purchase goods for consumption and hold
bonds. Labor is supplied at the extensive margin, so adjustment in the labor market
takes place through additional employed workers rather than varying the hours of
work. We consider the households as extended families who pool consumption. This
assumption is conventional and is made to avoid distributional issues. Households
own the rms in the economy.
FirmsThere are two types of prot maximizing rms: wholesale and retail
rms. Production takes place in the wholesale rms who use labor as the sole
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factor of production. Matching workers and wholesale rms is a time consuming
and costly process which generates real rigidity into the economy. Wholesale rms
sell all their output to the retail rms at a competitive price. Retail rms transform
the intermediate goods purchased from the wholesale rms into di¤erentiated nal
goods and sell them in a monopolistically competitive market with staggered pricing
which generates the nominal rigidity of the model.
GovernmentThe government raises tax revenue by levying an income tax from
employed workers. The tax revenue is used to nance unemployment benets, tax
subsidies paid to workers and exogenous government expenditures.
Central bankThe central bank controls the nominal interest rate according to
an exogenous policy rule.
2.1 Households
There is a continuum of households on the unit interval in a discrete-time economy.
The representative household maximizes the expected present discounted utility
Et
1X
i=0
iu (Ct+i; Ct+i 1) (1)
where Ct = Ct +  h; and Ct is the consumption of a market purchased composite
good which will be dened below. The composite good consists of the di¤erentiated
goods produced by the retail rms. h is nontradable home production and  is an
indicator function taking the value of zero when an individual is employed and one
otherwise. The utility function allows for habit persistence. As monetary policy is
represented by an interest rate rule and our focus is not on the stock of money, we
consider a limit economy where the weight of the utility of the households holdings
of real money balances approaches zero in the utility function.
The households budget constraint is
PtDt + (1 + it 1)Bt 1 = PtCt +Bt (2)
whereDt is the family income which consists of wage income, unemployment income
and family share of rms prots. Bt is the households nominal holdings of bonds
and Pt is the retail price index. Using (1) and (2) we can derive the rst-order
condition
t =  (1 + it)Et

Pt
Pt+1

t+1 (3)
which is the households Euler condition, where
t  u1 (Ct; Ct 1) + Etu2 (Ct+1; Ct) :
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2.2 Wholesale rms and labor market search
Production takes place in the wholesale (intermediate product) rms. Labor is the
sole input in production and the matching of workers and rms involves search
frictions. A job-worker match generates a surplus, which is the sum of the gain for
a rm and worker of being matched relative to not being matched. The surplus is
divided by Nash bargaining as is common in the literature. Consequently the wage
in the intermediate sector does not equal the marginal productivity of a worker, as
it would in a Walrasian setup. In addition to match productivity, the wage depends
on the value of being idle for the rm and worker and the ease with which each
side can nd an alternative match. Unemployed workers receive an unemployment
benet and enjoy a value of nontradable home production (or leisure). The match
surplus and labor market tightness inuence the wage rate and govern job creation
and destruction.
2.2.1 Match productivity and job ows
To keep the model simple we assume that labor is the only input in the production
of intermediate goods. Match productivity is given by
yit = aitzt
where ait is match specic productivity and zt is a common aggregate productivity
measure. Each period ait is drawn from a time-invariant distribution with c.d.f.
F (a) and density f (a) : Denote the price at which wholesale rms sell output to
monopolistically competitive retail rms by Pwt , the retail price index is Pt and
t =
Pt
PWt
is the markup of retail over wholesale prices. The real value of output in
terms of time t consumption is  1t aitzt.
Production takes place once a rm and worker are matched. Matching of rms
and workers in the intermediate sector is characterized by a constant returns to
scale matching function
m (ut; vt) = Au

t v
1 
t
where ut and vt are unemployed workers and open vacancies at time t respectively,
0 <  < 1 and A > 0 is a shift parameter.2 The hazard rates for a rm of meeting
a worker and a worker of meeting a rm are respectively
qft =
m (ut; vt)
vt
= A t (4)
qwt =
m (ut; vt)
ut
= A1 t (5)
2The Cobb-Douglas matching function is supported by a number of empirical studies. For a
survey on the matching function see Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001).
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where t = vtut is labor market tightness. The tighter the labor market, the easier it
is for the worker to nd a rm and harder for a rm to nd a worker. Thus qft is
decreasing and qwt is increasing in t:
Jobs are destroyed due to exogenous shocks and endogenous separation decisions
of rms and workers. Exogenous shocks arrive at rate x at the beginning of each
period. For the matches that survive, the rm and worker jointly observe the
realization of match productivity and decide whether to continue or destroy the
match. Jobs with a productivity realization that is below an endogenous reservation
productivity ~at are destroyed. Endogenous job destruction is then
nt = Pr [at  ~at] = F (~at) (6)
and the aggregate separation rate is
t = 
x + (1  x) nt : (7)
With job creation and destruction characterized as above, the number of matches
that enter period t+ 1 is
nt+1 = (1  t)nt +m (ut; vt) (8)
where nt is period t employment. The measure of searching workers is
ut = 1  nt + tnt = 1  (1  t)nt: (9)
The number of searching workers in period t di¤ers from the number of unemployed
workers, 1 nt; in the beginning of period t as some of the employed workers separate
from their matches and start searching for a new job within the same period.
Furthermore, we determine the net job creation and destruction rates. Each
period qft vt vacancies are lled. A fraction 
x of the new and previously existing
matches are destroyed exogenously immediately at the beginning of the period. The
rate of turnover is then qft 
xnt and the net job creation rate can be expressed as
jct =
qft vt
nt
  qft x: (10)
The net job destruction rate is
jdt = t   qft x (11)
where t is the aggregate job destruction rate and q
f
t 
x are the exogenously destroyed
matches that rematch within the same period.
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2.2.2 Match surplus and value functions
Match surplus is a key object in determining job creation and destruction. The
surplus is the di¤erence of the values of being matched and the outside values and
is given by
St (ait) = Jt (ait) +Wt (ait)  Vt   Ut (12)
where Jt (ait) and Wt (ait) are the values for a rm and worker of being matched
and Vt and Ut are the values of idleness for the worker and rm, that is having an
open vacancy for the rm and being unemployed for the worker.
Firm The value for a rm of a lled job Jt (ait) and a vacancy Vt are given by
Jt (ait) =
aitzt
t
  wt (aitzt) (13)
+maxEtt+1

(1  x)
Z at+1
~at+1
Jt+1 (ait+1) dF (ait+1) + 
xVt+1

Vt =  + Ett+1

qft (1  x)
Z at+1
~at+1
Jt+1 (ait+1) dF (ait+1) +

1  qft

Vt+1

(14)
The value of a lled job is determined by the real value of match output aitzt
t
(in terms of of time t consumption goods) minus the wage wt (aitzt) paid to the
worker, and the expected future value of the job, which is discounted according to
the discount factor t+i =
it+i
t
. The wage paid by the rm includes income taxes
paid by the worker to the government. The expected value of the job takes into
account that the job may be destroyed due to an exogenous shock with probability
x and that jobs with a productivity realization ait+1 < ~at+1 will be destroyed
endogenously.
The value of having an open vacancy involves a periodical cost  of having
an open vacancy and the expected surplus of a lled job. The latter depends on
the endogenous rate qft of nding an appropriate worker, and that the job is not
destroyed due to an exogenous shock or endogenously due to a low realization of
match specic productivity. There is free-entry of rms to the market so rms enter
until Vt = 0: Substituting this into (14) produces the job creation condition

qft
= (1  x)Ett+1
Z at+1
~at+1
Jt+1 (ait+1) dF (ait+1) : (15)
The job creation equation states that the expected surplus for the rm must
equal the cost of posting a vacancy. The right hand side of the equation gives the
expected surplus that accrues to the rm from a lled job. The left hand side is the
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expected cost of lling the vacancy, where qft is the probability of the rm nding
a worker so 1
qft
is the expected duration of search.
Worker The values for the worker of employment Wt (ait) and unemployment Ut
are respectively
Wt (ait) = wt (aitzt)  T (wt (aitzt)) (16)
+Ett+1

(1  x)
Z at+1
~at+1
Wt+1 (ait+1) dF (ait+1) + 
xUt+1

Ut = h+ bt (H (~at) zt) (17)
+Ett+1

qwt (1  x)
Z at+1
~at+1
Wt+1 (ait+1) dF (ait+1) + (1  qwt (1  x))Ut+1

An employed worker earns a wage of wt (aitzt) and makes a transfer T (wt (aitzt))
to the tax authorities which will be discussed in more detail below. The expected
value of employment depends on the probability of not being destroyed by an exoge-
nous shock and that the match specic productivity realization satises ait+1  ~at:
In the case of destruction the worker enjoys the value of unemployment Ut+1: An
unemployed worker enjoys the value of leisure (or home production) h and an un-
employment compensation bt (wet (H (~at) zt)) ; which will be dened below. The
probabilities and values of being employed or unemployed next period a¤ect the
value of unemployment in the current period.
2.2.3 Employment taxes and unemployment income
From the variety of possible tax policy schemes we will focus on income taxation
and unemployment benets.3 Taxes on labor income and unemployment earnings
are modeled in a simple manner by using three policy instruments: a marginal tax
on total labor earnings, a tax subsidy for employed workers and unemployment
compensation. We assume that wage taxes are linear and smooth functions of in-
come. In our benchmark case employed workers receive a tax subsidy  and are
subsequently taxed for their total earnings, the subsidy included, at proportional
rate  (s:t: 0    1) :4 The net income of a worker with match specic productiv-
ity ait is then (1  ) [wit (aitzt) + ] ; where wit (aitzt) is the wage of a worker with
3We abstract from other policy aspects such as employment protection or promotion through
ring costs and hiring subsidies respectively, or the role of payroll taxes.
4The benchmark labor market policy setup follows Pissarides (2000), but in the analysis that
follows we will consider departures from these assumptions.
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match-specic productivity ait. The transfer from the worker to the tax authorities
is
Tit (wit (aitzt)) = wt (aitzt)  (1  )  (18)
The marginal tax rate is T 0 (wt (aitzt)) =  : A marginal increase in the wage of a
worker increases the tax trnasfer by  :When the tax subsidy  is positive, taxation
is progressive s.t. the average tax rate increases with the wage. When  = 0
taxation is proportional.
Unemployment compensation is modeled to be a policy determined replacement
ratio of net income.5 As there is a distribution of wages, one possibility would
be to set the unemployment compensation proportional to the average net wage.
To simplify the model we use instead average productivity and assume that the
unemployment compensation is proportional to the sum of the average productivity
and the tax subsidy. The unemployment compensation is then
bt = 
 (1  ) (H (~at) zt + ) : (19)
where  is the replacement rate andH (~at) is the conditional expectationE [a ja  ~at ].
This setup e¤ectively implies that the unemployment benet is subject to the mar-
ginal tax rate.6
2.2.4 Bargaining and the wage
The wage is determined by Nash bargaining and satises7
wt (aitzt) = argmax [Jt (ait)  Vt]1  [Wt (ait)  Ut] (22)
5This is not the case in all European countries.
6An alternative way to model taxes and the unemployment compensation scheme would be to
follow e.g. Pissarides (1998) by assuming that the net income of a worker with match specic
productivity ait is (1  )wit (aitzt) +  i.e. the tax subsidy is not subject to the marginal
tax (in the benchmark case we assumed that employed workers receive a tax subsidy  and are
subsequently taxed for their total earnings, the subsidy included). The transfer from the worker
to the tax authorities in the alternative setup is then
Tit (wit (aitzt)) = wt (aitzt)  : (20)
Unemployment compensation can be assumed to be either xed or proportional to the average
producitvity (without the tax subsidy)
bt = 
H (~at) zt: (21)
The results presented above are qualitatively unambiguous and general and are not sensitive to
the calibration of the model or specic policy setup. However, the particular policy setup does
inuence the quantitative e¤ects of the policy instruments.
Another possibility to model tax progression is to use a tax exemption and a marginal tax.
7See appendix for detailed derivation of the wage.
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where  is the workers share of the match surplus. The rst order condition is
 (1  ) Jt (ait) = (1  ) [Wt (ait)  Ut] (23)
and implies the following relations
Jt (ait)  Vt = 1  
1   St (ait) (24)
Wt (ait)  Ut =  (1  )
1   St (ait) : (25)
The share parameter  increases the workers share of match surplus. Increasing
the marginal tax rate  has qualitatively similar e¤ects to the division of surplus
as a decrease in the share parameter: the higher the marginal tax rate, the lower is
the workers share of surplus relative to the rms. Substituting the value equations
into (23) and rearranging yields the wage equation8
wt (aitzt) = 

aitzt
t
+ t

+ (1  )

h
(1  ) + 
H (~at) zt   (1   ) 

: (26)
In addition to the real value of the marginal product aitzt
t
of the match, the
wage depends on the cost related to search in case of separation, as well as the
outside value of the worker. The wage is increasing in labor market tightness t
which reects the ease with which a worker can nd an alternative job in the case of
separation. The higher the value of home production h, the higher is the required
wage for the worker to agree to work. The wage is increasing in the bargaining
share  of the worker.
The partial comparative statics of the wage wrt. the policy parameters are
@wt
@
> 0,
@wt
@
< 0;
@wt
@
> 0:
A higher replacement rate  raises the workers unemployment income and threat
point in the wage bargain, thus raising the wage. The tax subsidy  paid to an
employed worker reduces the negotiated wage. This is because the cost of labor to
the rm is reduced as the workers employment is partly compensated by the tax
subsidy. As the wage is bargained for, the rm and worker share the subsidy in
the same way as they share the surplus of the job. The net gain from the subsidy
received upon job formation is (1   )  : employed workers receive the full subsidy
, but as the unemployment benet is proportional to net income (including the
subsidy), they already received a fraction  of it in their unemployment benet.
8Note that this is the gross wage that the rm pays to a worker while the workers after tax
net wage is wt (aitzt)  T (wt (aitzt)) = (1  ) [wt (aitzt) + ] :
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The marginal tax  reduces the workers share of match surplus. From any increase
in the wage conceded by the rm, the worker receives only a fraction 1    ; so
there is a joint loss to the rm and worker from the marginal tax. As the value
of unemployment includes home production which is not taxed, the marginal tax
reduces the value of working relative to being unemployed. Therefore the bargained
wage has to increase with the marginal tax to restore the value of working.
Note that the wage consists of market and nonmarket components. The rst
term in (26) consists of variables that reect market conditions, match productivity
and labor market tightness. The wage responds to changes and volatility in the
labor market through this term. The second term consists of non market or xed
parameters. The larger is this part of the wage relative to the market part, the
more rigid is the wage. The relative importance of these two terms determines how
much of exogenous shocks are absorbed by the wage. The more rigid the wage, the
more the shocks are transferred onwards to the protability of jobs and thus to the
job creation and destruction margins.
To illustrate this, consider two extreme cases of the wage negotiation outcome,
namely approaching solutions where one of the partners has all of the bargaining
power. When the workers bargaining power approaches unity ( ! 1) the second
term in the wage equation approaches zero and the wage equation becomes
wt (aitzt) =
aitzt
t
+ t:
Now there are no xed components and the whole wage consists only of market
termsmaking it more sensitive to market disturbances. The whole of the real value
of the marginal product aitzt
t
of the match accrues to the worker and the value of
unemployment becomes irrelevant. The worker can appropriate all of the match
surplus. The policy parameters have no inuence in this extreme case.
In the other extreme the rm has all bargaining power ( ! 0) and the wage
equation reduces to
wt =
h
(1  ) + 
H (~at) zt   (1   ) :
In this case the wage is immune to labor market tightness, and productivity a¤ects
only through the replacement ratio. However now the policy parameters have a
key inuence on the wage. In this case the match surplus goes entirely to the
rm and the wage paid to workers will be only as high as the value of leisure and
unemployment compensation. Here the policy parameters have qualtatively similar,
but more important, e¤ects on the wage as in the basic case.
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2.2.5 Job creation and destruction
To derive expressions for job creation and destruction we rst manipulate the value
equation for a lled job following Pissarides (2000, ch. 2). Substitute the wage
equation (26) and the free-entry condition Vt = 0 into the value equation for a lled
job (13) to get
Jt (ait) = (1  )

aitzt
t
  h
(1  )   
H (~at) zt +  (1   )

  t (27)
+Ett+1 (1  x)
Z at+1
~at+1
Jt+1 (ait+1) dF (ait+1) :
Evaluate this expression at ait = ~at and subtract the resulting equation from (27)
after noting that Jt (~at) = 0 by the denition of reservation productivity (jobs are
destroyed when match surplus goes to zero).9 We obtain
Jt (ait) = (1  ) zt
t
(ait   ~at) : (28)
Substituting this into the job creation condition (15) we get
Ett+1 (1  x) (1  )
zt+1
t+1
Z at+1
~at+1
(ait+1   ~at+1) dF (ait+1) = 
qft
: (29)
The left-hand side of the equation is decreasing in the reservation value ~at+1 for
match specic productivity and the right-hand side is increasing in labor market
tightness t (through q
f
t ), so (29) traces a negatively sloped curve in the (; ~a) space.
Jobs are destroyed when match surplus is zero, Jt (~ait) = 0: Setting (27) to equal
zero and substituting the job creation condition for the second row we obtain
~atzt
t
  h
(1  )   
H (~at) zt +  (1   )  
1  t +
1
1  

qft
= 0: (30)
The left-hand side of the equation isi increassing in the reservation value ~at and
decreasing in labor market tightness, so (29) traces a positively sloped curve in
the (; ~a) space. With these formulations of the job creation and destruction
conditions the policy instruments are present only in the latter.
2.3 Aggregate output and consumption
The aggregate output of the economy produced by all rm-worker matches is given
by
Qt = (1  t)ntzt
Z at
~at
aitf (ait) dait
1  F (~at) = (1  t)ntztH (~at) (31)
9The rm and worker agree when to separate as Jt (ait) = 0 implies Wt (ait)   Ut = 0 by the
Nash bargaining rule. Therefore we may consider job destruction from either the rms or workers
perspective.
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where H (~at) as the conditional expectation E [a j a  ~at] : Finally, we also require
that consumption Ct equals aggregate household income Yt which equals production
net of vacancy costs
Ct = Yt = (1  t)ntztH (~at)  vt: (32)
2.4 Retail rms and price rigidity
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive retail rms on the unit inter-
val. Retail rms buy output of wholesale rms at price PWt , di¤erentiate the good
and sell it to households. No other inputs or costs are used in the production of
nal goods, thus retail rms marginal cost is PWt and real marginal cost is
PWt
Pt
:
Output sold by retail rm j is yjt at price pjt: Final goods yt are a composite of
individual retail goods
yt =
Z 1
0
y
" 1
"
jt dj
 "
" 1
;
where " > 1 is the the elasticity of substitution across the di¤erentiated retail goods.
If resources are used e¢ ciently output of good j equals the demand (consumption)
of good j, yjt = cjt so we have
Ct =
Z 1
0
c
" 1
"
jt dj
 "
" 1
:
The demand for good j can be written as
cjt =

pjt
Pt
 "
Ct (33)
where the price elasticity of good j is ": As " ! 1, the goods become closer
substitutes and rms have less market power.
Following Walsh (2005) and Christiano et al. (2001) a fraction 1   ! of ran-
domly chosen rms adjusts its price optimally each period and a fraction ! adjusts
according to a rule of thumb.10 Optimally adjusting rms set their price to maxi-
mize the expected discounted value of current and future prots and all adjusting
rms choose the same price p: Prots at a future date t+ i are a¤ected by the price
chosen at date t if the rm has not had the possibility to update its price optimally
after t: The probability of this is !i: Firms choose pjt to maximize
Et
1X
i=0
!it+i

pjt
Pt+i
cjt+i   P
w
t+i
Pt+i
cjt+i

: (34)
10This is a variant of Calvo (1983).
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Using the demand curve (33) faced by the rm to eliminate cjt from the objective
function and substituting  1t+i =
Pwt+i
Pt+i
we obtain
Et
1X
i=0
!it+i
"
pjt
Pt+i
1 "
   1t+i

pjt
Pt+i
 "#
Ct+i: (35)
The rst order condition is after some manipulation11
pt
Pt
=

"
"  1
 EtP1i=0 !it+i h 1t+i Pt+iPt "Ct+ii
Et
P1
i=0 !
it+i

Pt+i
Pt
" 1
Ct+i
 : (36)
This equation gives the price chosen by the rms that adjust their price optimally.
The retail price index Pt is given by
Pt =
Z 1
0
p1 "jt dj
 1
1 "
(37)
from which we get
P 1 "t = (1  !) (pt )1 " + !p1 "jt 1 (38)
where a fraction (1  !) adjusts price optimally and a fraction ! adjusts according
to rule of thumb. We assume that rm j uses a rule of thumb based on the most
recently observed rate of ination and the most recently observed price level Pt 1,
pjt = t 1Pt 1: (39)
To obtain an expression for aggregate ination, (36) and (38) can be approx-
imated around a zero average ination steady state equilibrium and combined to
yield the New Keynesian Philips curve. We obtain
t =

1 + 
Ett+1 +
1
1 + 
t 1   
1 + 
^t: (40)
where  = (1 !)(1 !)
!
and ^t is the deviation of the price markup from the steady
state value.12
2.5 Monetary authority
The central bank controls the nominal rate of interest according to a modied Taylor
rule. The short-term nominal interest rate follows the process
Rt = R
R
t 1

Pt
Pt 1
(1 R)
et (41)
11See appendix for detailed derivation.
12See e.g. Walsh (2003) for a textbook derivation.
98
where R is the degree of interest rate smoothing,  > 1 is the response coe¢ cient
for ination and t is a serially uncorrelated, mean zero stochastic process. With
this policy rule for the nominal rate of interest, the nominal quantity of money
adjusts endogenously to satisfy the demand for money.
2.6 Government tax revenue
The government levies income taxes from workers to nance unemployment benets
and tax subsidies paid to workers. The government tax revenues are given by
Gt = (1  x)ntT [wet (H (~at) zt)]  (1  nt) bt (H (~at) zt) (42)
where T [wet (H (~at) zt)] and bt (H (~at) zt) are given by (18) and (19) respectively.
The government receives tax payments (marginal tax on gross income net of the
tax subsidy) from all employed workers whose jobs are not destroyed in the current
period. The unemployed workers receive an unemployment compensation from the
government.
3 Steady state solution and dynamics
In steady state we have t = 0 and pt = Pt = P and zt = z = 1: This implies
that the households Euler condition reduces to R = 1

and the steady state values
of n; ; u; qf ; qw; jc; ; w; ~a; C and the policy variables TR; T and b are given by the
steady state versions of equations (4) ; (5) ; (7) ; (8) ; (9) ; (10) ; (29) ; (26) ; (30) ; (32) ;
(42) ; (18) and (19)
 Firms hazard rate
qf =
m (u; v)
v
(43)
 Workers hazard rate
qw =
m (u; v)
u
(44)
 Destruction rate
 = x + (1  x)F (~a) (45)
 Employment
n = m (u; v) (46)
 Unemployed job seekers
u = 1  (1  )n (47)
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 Net job creation
jc =
m (u; v)
n
  qfx (48)
 Government tax revenue
G = (1  x)nT (w)  (1  n) b (49)
 Workers tax transfer to government
T = w   (1  )  (50)
 Unemployment compensation
b =  (1  ) (w + ) : (51)
 Wage
w = 

H (~a)

+ 

+ (1  )

h
1   + 
H (~a)  (1   ) 

(52)
 Free-entry

qf
=  (1  x) (1  ) 1

Z a
~a
(ai   ~a) dF (ai) (53)
 Job destruction treshold ~a
~a

  h
(1  )   
H (~a) +  (1   )  
1  
qw
qf
+
1
1  

qf
= 0 (54)
 Aggregate income and consumption
Y = C = (1  )nH (~a)  v (55)
 The steady-state price markup
 =
"
"  1 : (56)
The steady state soolution can be solved analytically. Equations (53) and (54)
produce a unique solution in the two endogenous variables ~a and  (through qf and
qw). We can then substitute these equilibrium values into (52) and solve the rest
of the equations recursively. The linearized equations used in the dynamic analysis
are presented in the appendix.
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4 Calibration
The baseline parameter values are calibrated to a stylized U.S. economy and to be
in line with previous literature.13 As information on all parameters is not avail-
able, we calibrate these values indirectly as residual parameters from the steady
state equations. The models parameters can be separated into six groups: labor
market parameters, labor market policy parameters, household preferences, para-
meters characterizing the degree of price rigidity, interest rate parameters and the
parameters of exogenous shocks.
Labor marketJob ows are determined by the matching and separation prob-
abilities of rms and workers. We set the time period to one quarter and the job
nding rate of workers and the rate of lling vacancies at qw = 0:6 and qf = 0:7
respectively. The matching function parameters are set to  = 0:4 for the workers
elasticity parameter and 1  = 0:6 for the rms elasticity parameter. These are in
accordance with empirical studies of the matching function.14 The shift parameter
of the matching function is A = 0:65; a value similar to that in e.g. Walsh (2004).
The size of the labor force is normalized to one and the employment rate is set
to n = 0:94; which implies an unemployment rate of 6 percent. The steady-state
number of workers searching for a job is then u = 0:154; as u also includes the total
n of workers who move to the matching market because their matches dissolve
before production is started. The total job destruction rate is set to  = 0:1 which
is roughly consistent with a large body of empirical studies.15 These values and the
matching function also imply v = 0:134: For the exogenous job destruction rate we
use the value calibrated by den Haan et al. (2000) x = 0:068 implying the en-
dogenous job destruction rate n = F (~a) = 0:034: The reservation productivity ~a
can be derived from ~a = F (n) 1 : Following eg. Mortensen and Pissarides (2003)
we assume that F (a) is the uniform c.d.f. with support [; 1]. In the linearized
model we need the elasticity of the c.d.f. at the reservation productivity level ~a;
which is given by eF;a =
@F (~a)
@~a
~a
F (~a)
= ~af(~a)
F (~a)
: For the conditional expectation of a
given the reservation productivity ~a we have H (~a) =
R a
~a
a f(a)
1 F (~a)da and the elastic-
ity eH;a =
@H(~a)
@~a
~a
H(~a)
: The worker and rm are assumed to get an equal share of the
match surplus in the wage bargaining so we set  = 0:5: The value of leisure h and
the lower support of the productivity distribution  are calibrated s.t. the model
is consistent with the values for n and n above. Finally q and  are calibrated as
13See eg. Walsh (2003, 2004), Trigari (2004), Krause and Lubik (2003) and den Haan et al.
(2000).
14See e.g. Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) and Blanchard and Diamond (1989).
15See e.g. Davis et al. (1998).
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residual parameters from the steady state equations.
Labor market policyWe calibrate the policy parameters together with the value
of home production in such a way that we obtain steady state values that are
roughly consistent with Walsh (2003, 2005) for reasonable tax parameter values.
Our strategy is to rst set the policy parameters to benchmark values s.t. taxation
is initially progressive and the replacement ratio similar to examples of the U.S.
used in the literature. We then reverse calibrate the value of home production h
s.t. the model produces steady state values that are consistent with eg. Walsh
(2003, 2005) calibrations. For the baseline calibration we set the marginal tax rate
to  = 0:25 and the tax subsidy  = 0:03: The positive tax subsidy implies that
income taxation is progressive. Finally, the replacement rate is set to  = 0:2 and
reverse calibration of the value of home production produces h = 0:53:
Household preferencesWe followWalsh (2005) for the utility function u (Ct+i) =
(Ct+i Ct+i 1)1 
1  where  is a parameter of habit persistence, and choose values for
the parameters of household preferences that are standard in the literature. We
set  = 0:5,  = 0:989 and the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion is chosen to be
 = 2: The steady state price markup for retail rms is set to equal  = 1:1 which
implies " = 11; which is the parameter that determines the elasticity of demand of
di¤erentiated retail goods.
Price rigidityThe degree of price rigidity is determined by the share of rms
who do not optimally adjust their price. We follow Walsh (2003) and set this
fraction to equal ! = 0:67:
Monetary policyWe set the parameters of the interest rate rule to equal  =
1:10, which gives a 110 basis points long-run nominal response to a 100 basis point
increase in ination, and R = 0:9 which is roughly consistent with the empirical
evidence on high inertia displayed by central bank policy rules (Walsh 2005). The
standard deviation of the monetary policy shock is set to t = 0:002:
Productivity shockWe assume that the log aggregate productivity shock to
follow an AR(1) process log zt = z log zt 1 + t with the serial coe¢ cient z = 0:95
and the standard deviation of the productivity shock shock t; to be  = 0:01:
5 Model analysis
We proceed by rst analyzing the steady state of the model and the comparative
statics of the labor market policy parameters. Then we move to the impulse response
analysis to study the e¤ects of taxes on the dynamic behavior of the model.
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Benchmark db dc d_b
y 0. 66 0. 62 0. 69 0. 62
q 0. 67 0. 63 0. 70 0. 63
n 0. 94 0. 91 0. 96 0. 90
S 0. 88 0. 76 1. 02 0. 74
qf 0. 70 0. 73 0. 65 0. 74
qw 0. 60 0. 56 0. 67 0. 55
a 0. 58 0. 59 0. 56 0. 59
jc 0. 031 0. 033 0. 253 0. 034
Figure 1: Percentage point changes in policy parameters.
5.1 Steady state labor market policy analysis
5.1.1 Employment taxes and unemployment income
First we consider the e¤ects of changes in policy parameters on the steady state
of the economy independently of tax revenue considerations (gure 1). We then
investigate compensating policy changes to study the impact of changes in the tax
structure (gure 2). With tax revenue neutral changes we x the government tax
revenue and consequently the tax subsidy solves as an endogenous variable of the
model which depends on the marginal tax rate. The e¤ects of policy work through
the wage on the job destruction condition, which jointly with the job creation
condition determines the equilibrium destruction productivity and labor market
tightness.
Marginal tax rateConsider a marginal increase in the income tax rate  . As
home production (or leisure) is not taxed its value relative to working increases
making the latter less attractive. To restore the attractiveness of working the wage
must be increased. Higher wages imply lower job creation and lower labor market
tightness; less vacancies and more unemployed workers. Output falls as less people
are employed and jobs are fewer.
Tax subsidy Increasing the tax subsidy  has opposite e¤ects to the marginal
tax rate. The tax subsidy paid to an employed worker reduces the negotiated wage
as the workers employment is partly compensated by the tax subsidy. Bargaining
implies that the rm and worker share the subsidy. The reduction in the negotiated
wage raises job creation, vacancies and labor market tightness. Unemployment falls
as the job nding probability for workers increases. Output increases.
Replacement ratioA higher replacement rate increases the workers unemploy-
ment income and threat point in the wage bargain. The wage increases with e¤ects
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similar to those of the marginal tax.
5.1.2 Tax progression
We next examine the importance of the structure of taxes for the labor market
equilibrium. Keeping the government tax revenue xed, we increase tax progression
by increasing the marginal tax rate and then increase the tax subsidy so much that
the change in tax revenue implied by the marginal tax raise is exhausted. Given the
comparative statics of the marginal tax and tax subsidy described above, the e¤ects
of increasing tax progression are ambiguous a priori, and depend on the relative
magnitude of the e¤ects of the tax instruments.
Progressive taxes in initial equilibriumFigure 2 shows how a revenue neutral
increase in tax progression a¤ects the steady state of the economy in the benchmark
calibration. The wage rate increases, inducing more job destruction, reducing labor
market tightness and thus raising unemployment. Output decreases. The e¤ect of a
tax revenue neutral increase in tax progression is qualitatively similar to an increase
in the marginal tax. The e¤ect on the steady state values of the change in the mar-
ginal tax dominates the e¤ect of the tax subsidy. However the e¤ect of the marginal
tax is moderated by the opposite e¤ect of the tax subsidy. A more progressive tax
scheme thus shifts the economy to a lower output and higher unemployment equi-
librium. To our knowledge this result is new to the literature and opposite to results
in earlier studies using a similar modelling framework. This tax structure involves
a trade-o¤ between income equality considerations and equilibrium unemployment
and output.
Proportional taxes in initial equilibriumThe above result is in contrast with
the results of Pissarides (1998) and Sinko (2005). In their studies increasing tax
progression has a positive employment e¤ect, whereas we nd a negative one. The
key issue between these opposite reults is the initial degree of tax progression. Pis-
sarides (1998) and Sinko (2005) consider the e¤ects of a tax revenue neutral increase
in tax progression when taxation is initially proportional (the tax subsidy is zero),
whereas we start from an initially progressive tax scheme. Experimenting with the
policy instruments reveals that our model also produces qualitatively similar results
to the above studies when taxation is proportional in the initial state. The smaller
is the tax subsidy in the initial state, the smaller is the negative e¤ect of the mar-
ginal tax increase on employment relative to the positive e¤ect of the tax subsidy
increase. For a su¢ ciently small tax subsidy the relative e¤ects are reversed and
the employment e¤ect turns positive. The wage rate decreases with tax progres-
sion, inducing more job creation and vacancies, higher labor market tightness and
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b = 0. 25,c = 0. 03 b = 0. 26,c = 0. 038 b = 0. 30,c = 0. 071
y 0. 659 0. 655 0. 641
q 0. 667 0. 663 0. 650
n 0. 94 0. 937 0. 951
S 0. 880 0. 865 0. 819
qf 0. 70 0. 70 0. 71
qw 0. 60 0. 60 0. 58
a 0. 577 0. 578 0. 583
jc 0. 030 0. 031 0. 032
Figure 2: Tax revenue neutral increase in tax progression.
lower unemployment. Output increases. In this case promoting income equality is
consistent with lower equilibrium unemployment and higher output.
Our opposite results to those of Pissarides (1998) and Sinko (2005) show that the
e¤ects of increasing tax progression depend on the initial degree of tax progression
in the economy. Our results are not in conict with these studies, but completes
them by empasizing the mechanism by which progression works. Our simulations
show that, starting from a proportional tax scheme, the relative strength of the two
tax policy instruments is reversed as progression increases. Initially the e¤ect of the
tax subsidy dominates, but once the initial tax scheme is su¢ ciently progressive,
the e¤ect of the marginal tax dominates. This implies that for economies with
an initially low degree of tax progression, increasing it is benecial in terms of
employment and output. But for economies with a su¢ ciently progressive tax
scheme initially, increasing progression further is harmful in terms of employment
and output.
5.2 Tax reform and shock propagation
Now we investigate how changes in labor market policy instruments a¤ect shock
propagation. As in the previous section, our strategy is to rst look at the e¤ect of
policy parameters separately without government tax revenue considerations and
then examine tax revenue neutral changes in the tax structure.
5.2.1 Employment taxes and unemployment income
The e¤ects of the tax instruments on the impulse response functions to productivity
and interest rate shocks are plotted by the solid lines in gure 3 and 4 respectively.
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Figure 3: Impulse response functions to output shock. The baseline case is plotted by the solid lines, the dotted
lines plot the impulse responses for  = 0:26 and the dashed lines plot the impulse response functions for  = 0:04:
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Figure 4: Impulse response functions to policy shock. The baseline case is plotted by the solid lines, the dotted
lines plot the impulse responses for  = 0:26 and the dashed lines plot the impulse response functions for  = 0:04:
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The dotted lines plot the impulse responses for a percentage point increase in the
income tax rate. The impulse response functions for a percentage point increase
in the tax subsidy are produced by the dashed lines. For the sake of clarity in the
gure, the impulse response functions for the replacement rate is not plotted as the
plots overlap closely those of the marginal tax.
Marginal tax rateThe impulse response functions of a productivity shock are
generally amplied by the marginal tax increase, but the shapes of the functions
remain qualitatively the same. Both peak e¤ects are larger and the shocks are more
persistent. In fact, this e¤ect is similar to the e¤ect of reducing the bargaining power
of workers described in Walsh (2003). This should not be surprising, considering
the discussion in section 2:2:4 on the way the marginal tax a¤ects the division of
match surplus. A higher marginal tax increases the weight of the non market
component in the wage equation relative to the market sensitive part. This implies
that the wage becomes more rigid and absorbs less of shocks, transmitting them on
to the rest of the economy through job creation and destruction. The marginal tax
a¤ects the impulse responses to an interest rate shock in a more diverse way. The
impulse responses of output and employment are amplied both in the peak e¤ect
and persistence. The peak e¤ect of ination is moderated but the impulse response
is more persistent. This applies to the labor market tightness and to the rms and
workers hazard rates as well.
Tax subsidyThe tax subsidy has the opposite e¤ect to the marginal tax rate.
The impulse responses to a productivity shock are smoothed: both peak e¤ects
and persistence are reduced by the tax subsidy. The tax subsidy increase has an
opposite e¤ect to the marginal tax in the wage equation. An increase in the tax
subsidy increases relative size of the market sensitive component of the wage. This
implies that the wage absorbs more of the shocks and less of them transmit to the
rest of the economy. The tax subsidy smooths the impulse responses of output and
employment wrt. an interest rate shock. The peak e¤ects of ination, labor market
tightness and the hazard rates are amplied but the impulse responses are more
persistent.
Replacement ratioThe replacement rate has qualitatively similar e¤ects to the
marginal tax for similar reasons.
5.2.2 Tax progression
We now proceed to investigate the importance of the structure of taxation for
the dynamics of the economy wrt. shocks. As in the steady state analysis we
consider increasing the marginal tax rate and making the necessary increase in the
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Figure 5: Impulse responses to productivity shock and initially progressive taxation. The baseline case is poltted
by solid lines and increased progression is plotted by the dotted lines.
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Figure 6: Impulse responses to policy shock and initially progressive taxation. The baseline case is poltted by solid
lines and increased progression is plotted by the dotted lines.
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tax subsidy to keep government tax revenues neutral. The same forces are at work
here as in the steady state analysis: the initial degree of tax progression determines
the relative e¤ects of the two tax parameters and thus the e¤ects of increasing tax
progression.
Progressive taxes in initial equilibrium Figures 5 and 6 plot the impulse re-
sponses of the benchmark setup to productivity and interest rate shocks respec-
tively. With an increase in tax progression the impulse responses are amplied,
both in terms of peak e¤ects as well as persistence. The reasoning is analogous
to that of the previous section where the steady state e¤ects where analyzed. The
amplifying e¤ect on the impulse responses of the marginal tax dominates that of
the tax subsidy. For interest rate shocks the impulse responses are a¤ected by tax
progression qualitatively in the same way as by the marginal tax. Overall, tax
progression implies a more volatile economy in the benchmark calibration.
Proportional taxes in initial equilibriumThe impulse responses to productivity
and interest rate shocks for a calibration with the tax subsidy being zero in the initial
state are plotted in gures 7 and 8. As in the steady state analysis the results of the
alternative setup are opposite to the benchmark case. Now the impulse responses
wrt. to a productivity shock are smoother and less persistent, both in terms of peak
e¤ects as well as persistence. In this alternative setup tax progression, or promoting
income equality is consistent with a less volatile economy.
The implications of labor tax reform depend crucially on the initial tax scheme.
Summarizing, increasing tax progression has desirable output and employment ef-
fects when initially progression is low and the tax subsidy e¤ect dominates. But
the higher is theinitial level of progression, further increases in tax progression are
less and less desirable because the e¤ect of the marginal tax strengthens relative to
the tax subsidy e¤ect. Thus, when tax progression is initially high, the marginal
tax e¤ect dominates the tax subsidy e¤ect and the output and employment e¤ecs
become detrimental.
6 Concluding remarks
The paper illustrates the importance of the initial degree of tax progression in
determining both the steady state and dynamic e¤ects of labor tax reforms. The
main conclusion is that the macroeconomic outcomes of tax reforms depend on the
initial degree of tax progression which determines the relative e¤ects of the tax
instruments. In an economy with initially proportional labor taxation, increasing
progression has desirable equilibrium employment and output e¤ects and stabilizing
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Figure 7: Impulse responses to productivity shock and initially propotional taxation. The initial value responses
are poltted by solid lines and increased progression is plotted by the dotted lines.
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Figure 8: Impulse responses to policy shock and initially proportional taxes. The initial value responses are poltted
by solid lines and increased progression is plotted by the dotted lines.
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dynamic e¤ects. However, if the tax scheme is initially su¢ ciently progressive,
increasing progression has opposite e¤ects: the equilibrium employment and output
e¤ects are negative and the the sesitivity to shocks is amplied.
Our simulations show that interactions of policy tools di¤er depending on the
state of the labor market. As very di¤erent policy schemes are implemented in Eu-
ropean countries and these countries have large variation in labor market outcomes,
it would be of interest to study the implications of tax reforms in these di¤erent
setups. Also, as a large set of policy instruments is available to the policy maker,
a more comprehensive study including tools such as payroll taxes, hiring subsidies
and ring costs would o¤er more insight into the e¤ects of tax reforms and the
alternatives available and trade-o¤s involved when designing tax reforms.
There are several issues that deserve attention in future research. We have in-
vestigated the e¤ects of taxation on macroeconomic outcomes in a framework which
incorporates the search-matching model of the labor market to a New Keynesian
business cycle model. A word of caution regarding the results may be in order.
Pissarides (1998) points out that there is no denitive model of the European la-
bor market and shows that e¤ects of changes in the structure and level of taxation
sometimes depends on the underlying model of the labor market. One avenue for
future research would be to consider the implications of the choice of the labor
market model nested in the New Keynesian framework.
Finally, an important issue in matching models is the ine¢ ciency typically pro-
duced by matching frictions and decentralized bargaining. An alternative approach
to labor market policy is to design taxation so as to internalize search externalities
and improve the e¢ ciency of resource allocation. This question is also left for future
work.
A Appendix
A.1 Bargaining and wage
The match surplus is shared between the rm and the worker according to the
parameter  which represents the workers share of the match surplus (bargaining
power). The wage rate thus satises
wt = argmax [Wt (ait)  Ut] [Jt (ait)  Vt]1  : (57)
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The rst order condition is given by

@Wt (ait)
@wt
(Wt (ait)  Ut) 1 (Jt (ait)  Vt)
+(1  ) @Jt (ait)
@wt
(Wt (ait)  Ut) (Jt (ait)  Vt) 
= 0
Divide both sides by [Jt (ait)  Vt] 1 [Wt (ait)  Ut]  to get

@Wt (ait)
@wt
(Jt (ait)  Vt) + (1  ) @Jt (ait)
@wt
(Wt (ait)  Ut) = 0
where @Jt(ait)
@wt
=  1 and @Wt(ait)
@wt
= 1   T 0 (wt) = 1    so the rst order condition
becomes
 (1  ) Jt (ait) = (1  ) (Wt (ait)  Ut) : (58)
Substituting the value equations (13) ; (16) ; (17) and Vt+1 = 0 into the rst order
condition and cancelling terms produces
(1  )wt (aitzt) (59)
=  (1  ) aitzt
t
+  (1  )Ett+1

(1  x) qwt+1
Z at+1
~at+1
Jt+1 (ait+1) dF (ait+1)

+(1  ) [A+ h+ bt + T (wt (aitzt))]
where we have used the rst order condition to obtain the last term of the second
row. Substituting equations (18) ; (19) and
Ett+1 (1  x) [Wt+1 (ait)  Ut+1] =
 (1  )
(1  ) Ett+1 (1  
x) Jt+1 (ait)
=
 (1  )
(1  )

qft
into (59) and dividing both sides of the resulting equation by (1  ) produces
wt (aitzt) = 

aitzt
t
+ 

+ (1  )

A+ h
(1  ) + 
aetzt   (1   ) 

(60)
where t =
Pt
PWt
.
A.2 Price rigidity and Phillips curve
Firms choose pjt to maximize
Et
1X
i=0
!it+i

pjt
Pt+i
cjt+i   P
w
t+i
Pt+i
cjt+i

: (61)
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where t+i =
it+i
t
. Using the demand curve (33) faced by the rm we can eliminate
cjt to get the objective function and substitute and  1t+i =
Pwt+i
Pt+i
to get
Et
1X
i=0
!it+i
"
pjt
Pt+i
1 "
   1t+i

pjt
Pt+i
 "#
Ct+i: (62)
The rst order condition is
Et
1X
i=0
!it+i
"
(1  ")

pt
Pt+i
 "
+ " 1t+i

pt
Pt+i
 " 1#
1
Pt+i
Ct+i = 0:
Re-express this as
Et
1X
i=0
!it+i

(1  ")

1
Pt+i

+ " 1t+i
1
pt
 
pt
Pt

Pt
Pt+i
 "
Ct+i = 0
Divide by p

t
Pt
and rearrange
Et
1X
i=0
!it+i
"
1
Pt+i

Pt
Pt+i
 "
Ct+i
#
=
"
("  1)Et
1X
i=0
!it+i
 1
t+i
"
1
pt

Pt
Pt+i
 "
Ct+i
#
Multiply and divide the left side by Pt
Et
1X
i=0
!it+i
"
1
Pt

Pt
Pt+i

Pt
Pt+i
 "
Ct+i
#
=
"
("  1)Et
1X
i=0
!it+i
 1
t+i
"
1
pt

Pt
Pt+i
 "
Ct+i
#
Then multiply both sides by pt and rearrange to obtain
pt
Pt
=

"
"  1
 EtP1i=0 !it+i h 1t+i Pt+iPt "Ct+ii
Et
P1
i=0 !
it+i

Pt+i
Pt
" 1
Ct+i
 (63)
The retail price index Pt is given by
Pt =
Z 1
0
p1 "jt dj
 1
1 "
(64)
from which we get
P 1 "t = (1  !) (pt )1 " + !p1 "jt 1 (65)
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where a fraction (1  !) adjusts price optimally and a fraction ! adjusts according
to rule of thumb. We assume that rm j uses a rule of thumb based on the most
recently observed rate of ination and the most recently observed price level Pt 1,
pjt = t 1Pt 1: (66)
To obtain an expression for aggregate ination, equations (63) and (65) can be
approximated around a zero average ination steady state equilibrium.
A.3 Linearized equations
Linearizing the model around the non-stochastic zero-ination steady state produces
the equations below. The variables are expressed in terms of percentage deviations
around the steady state.
 The Euler condition from households problem
0 = Ety^t+1   y^t   1

(r^t   Et^t+1) (67)
 Survival rate of matches 't = 1  t
'^t =  

n
1  n

eF;aa^t (68)
where eF;a =
@F (~a)
@~a
~a
F (~a)
:
 Employment (evolution of number of matches) nt+1
n^t+1 = 'n^t + ''^t +

vqf
n

v^t +

vqf
n

q^f (69)
 Unemployment (number of unemployed job seekers ut)
u^t =   'n
u
n^t   n'
u
'^t (70)
 Probability of lling vacancy for rm qf
q^ft =  (u^t   v^t) (71)
 Equality of rms lling vacancies and workers nding jobs
v^t + q^
f
t = u^t + q^
w
t (72)
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 The nominal interest rate rule
r^t = Rr^t 1 +  (1  R)t + t (73)
 Ination
^t =

1 + 
Et^t+1 +
1
1 + 
^t 1   
1 + 
Et 1^t (74)
where  = (1 !)(1 !)
!
:
 Output equation
y^t =
Q
y
(z^t + eH;aa^t + '^t + n^t) 
v
y
v^t (75)
where eH;a =
@H(~a)
@~a
~a
H(~a)
:
 Wage at destruction margin
w^t = 

~a
w
(a^t + z^t   ^t) +

w

^t   ^t

+
(1  )
(1  )
 b
w
b^t   h
w
^t

(76)
 Unemployment compensation
b^t = 
 (1  ) H (~a)b
 
eH(a);~aa^t + z^t

(77)
 Endogenous job creation
 q^ft = ^t+1   ^t + '^t+1 + z^t+1   ^t+1 (78)
+Et (1  ) 'q
f

h
H (~a)eH;a   ~a
i
a^t+1
 Endogenous job destruction
~a

(a^t + z^t   ^t)  ww^t  

qf

^t + q^
f
t

= 0 (79)
or, substituting the wage and unemployment benet equations into the job
destruction equation yields
a

a^t +

a

  H (~at)


(z^t   ^t)  
H (~at) eH;a

a^t
  q
w
(1  ) qf q^
w
t  
(1  qw)
(1  ) qf q^
f
t
= 0:
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